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A REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD'S DEFERRAL POLICY
MICHAEL A. MURPHY AND MICHAEL A. STERLACCI*
I.

INTRODUCTION

IN

1971, the National Labor Relations Board handed down its now
well-publicized decision in Collyer Insdated Wire.' Essentially, the
Board announced a policy decision of deferring section 8(a) (5) 2 cases
to the arbitral process where arbitration was provided for in a collective
bargaining agreement. The concept of deferral itself was certainly not
novel, having been invoked as far back as 1943 in Consolidated Aircraft
Corp? Pre-Collyer, the application of such a principle had been at best
inconsistent; the apparent intent of Collyer, however, was to formulate a
consistent and firm policy of deferral.
Some critics have called this policy a product of the Nixon Board.
Although it is true that incoming Member Penello was the catalyst for
crystallizing Collyer, by turning what had been a two-two stalemate in
the hiatus between his appointment and the departure of Board Member
Brown into a three-two majority in favor of Collyer, it was the concurring
opinion of Member Brown, long an advocate of deferral 4 which ushered
in the tide of change. Furthermore, many legal scholars had predicted
and called for the precise Collyer approach long before "baby Collyer"
was born.'
Whether Collyer might best be categorized as a revolution or an
evolution is debatable. An attempt will be made to trace the meanderings
of the law in this area prior to Collyer and it will be left to the reader
to decide whether its advent was precipitous or gradual. Perhaps it was
a combination of both.
* Mr. Murphy received his BA. from Seton Hall College, and his J.D. and LL.M from
Georgetown University Law Center. He is currently associated with the firm of Kane and
Koons in Washington, D.C., and is a member of the New Jersey and District of Columbia
Bars. Mr. Sterlacci received his B.A. from Seton Hall College, and his J.D. from George
Washington University Law School He is currently an Assistant General Counsel with the
United States Information Agency, in Washington, D.C., and is a member of the New York
and District of Columbia Bars.
1. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971), noted in 41 Fordham L. Rev. 175 (1972).
2. Of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970). See note 61 infra.
3. 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 706-07 (1943), enforced in pertinent part, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.
1944).
4. See, e.g., Univis, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 37 (1968) (Member Brown, dissenting); Unit
Drop Forge, 171 N.L.R.B. 600, 604 (1968) (Members Brown and Zagoria, dissenting). See
also Member Brown's concurring opinion in Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 843-46.
5. See, e.g., Samoff, Arbitration, Not NLRB Intervention, 18 Lab. L.J. 602 (1967).
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We will also see how baby Collyer "grew up," as the Board put it.'
An analysis of Collyer itself would indicate clearly that the new policy
would encompass nothing more than the section 8(a) (5) area; but once
the door was opened, that section was not to be the only one affected.
Sections 8(a) (3)7 and 8(a) (1)8 also have now been included within the
scope of Collyer. This has brought forth a visceral reaction on the part
of Collyer critics who contend that the floodgates have been opened.
Adherents of the decision applaud the extension of Collyer as a solidification of a sound deferral policy in accord with the principles of Occam's
Razor that entities-in this case labor proceedings-are not to be multiplied without necessity.
An examination will also be made of the Collyer-type cases recently
decided, and of those pending on the appellate level in the federal courts.
Each of these several cases has its own distinct factual nuances, but,
generally, the Board appears to be very pleased with its new approach for
a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the lightening of its everburgeoning caseload. Unions, for the most part, seem to be aligned
squarely against such a Board deferral policy, for a multitude of reasons
which will become clearer upon examination of the motivating factors of
the various parties. Perhaps we will find that even management, which
for the most part has aligned itself with the Board, has on occasion
opposed the deferral policy.'
What the ultimate outcome will be is, of course, purely conjectural and
is likely to be resolved only by the Supreme Court. Judging from the
notoriety which the decision already has received, it seems almost a
certainty that one or more of the Collyer-type cases will be selected for
Supreme Court review. Nonetheless, it is appropriate at this time to
attempt an evaluation of the Collyer doctrine, its faults and attributes,
as well as its likelihood of remaining a permanent fixture in the law.
H.

PRE-COLLYER BACKGROUND

The year 1935 saw the passage of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), also called the Wagner Act."0 Section 7 of the Act1" guarantees
employees the right to organize free from undue influence or interference.
Those practices which Congress wished to proscribe as interfering with an
employee's section 7 rights are specifically enumerated as "unfair labor
6. Little Collyer Grows Up, remarks of NLRB Chairman Edward B. Miller before the
Industrial Relations Research Association, Sept. 12, 1972.

7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
8. Id. § 158(a)(1).
9. E.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (July 31, 1972), enforced, 479 F.2d
770 (2d Cir. 1973).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
11. Id. § 157.
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practices" in section 8 of the Act.' 2 In section 10, Congress addressed
itself to the prevention of such unfair labor practices. The language in
section 10(a) which was later to become a focal point of much dispute,
reads in part:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice... [listed in section 8] affecting commerce. This
power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
23
been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise ....
This then was the state of the law in 1935. Employees had the right to
organize and could not be interfered with in any of the ways enumerated
in section 8. The Board's power as the body authorized to prevent such
abuses was clear and unequivocal.
The Act itself was silent on the Board's right to defer exercise of its
own powers to the arbitration process. However, it has been noted that
when the original bill was drafted, Senator Wagner proposed that section
10(b) contain language providing that the
Board may, in its discretion, defer its exercise of jurisdiction over any such unfair
labor practice in any case where there is another means of prevention provided for by
agreement ....14
This language was later deleted, however, and was not part of the final
enactment. Therefore, at least by inference, it appears that there was some
congressional opposition to deferral.
Then, in the 1943 Consolidated Aircraft" decision, the Board chose
for the first time to defer rather than to exercise its authority. No furor
appears to have resulted over this decision; I enforcement was granted
without comment by the appellate court. 17
In 1947, the National Labor Relations Act underwent what have come
to be known as the Taft-Hartley amendments, also referred to as the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). s Section 3010 therein
provided for court enforcement of any contractual agreement between
an employer and a labor union. Section 203 (d) provided in part:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising20 over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.
Id. § 158.
13. Id. § 160(a).
14. S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 79 Cong. Rec. 2369 (1935). See also Brief for the
NLRB at 18 n.17, IBEW v. NLRB, Nos. 72-1944 & 72-1995 (D.C. Cir., filed Oct. 20, 1972).
12.

15.
16.

47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943), enforced in pertinent part, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944).
For a more detailed discussion see 6 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 720, 725 (1972).

17. 141 F.2d at 788.
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-68, 171-87 (1970).
19. Id. § 185.
20. Id. § 173(d).
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It has been argued that this language overrides section 10(a) of the Act
and indicates a congressional intent to encourage arbitration.21 One must
also consider that section 14(c) 22 of the amended Wagner Act does authorize the Board to decline to assert jurisdiction if it does not feel that the
ramifications of such deferral would have a substantial effect on commerce.
Whatever the potential inconsistencies in the 1947 Act, there emerged
in 1955 the Spielberg doctrine sa which has remained firmly entrenched
in labor law for almost twenty years. Under Spielberg, the Board will
defer to the arbitration process when an arbitrator has already passed
judgment on a labor dispute if (1) the proceedings are fair and regular;
(2) all parties agree to be bound; and (3) the decision is not repugnant
to the purposes and policies of the Act.2 4 As the Spielberg deferral policy
became more sharply delineated, the Board indicated that in addition to
the criteria set forth above, it would not defer unless it found that the
unfair labor practice issue had been presented to and passed on by the
arbitrator.2 5
The Board's position in Spielberg was clearly affirmed in International
Harvester Co.2 6 There, the Board had stated that "it is . . . well established that the Board has considerable discretion to respect an arbitration
award and decline to exercise its authority over alleged unfair labor
practices if to do so will serve the fundamental aims of the Act."27 The
Supreme Court added its imprimatur in Carey v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.,28 quoting with approval the following language from International
Harvester:
The Act, as has repeatedly been stated, is primarily designed to promote industrial
peace and stability by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.
Experience has demonstrated that collective-bargaining agreements that provide for
final and binding arbitration of grievance and disputes arising thereunder, "as a substitute for29industrial strife," contribute significantly to the attainment of this statutory
objective.

Meanwhile, there had been considerable development in the law as
21. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452-56 (1957). See also
text accompanying notes 75-78 infra.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1970) (added by Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
§ 701(a), 73 Stat. 541).
23. From Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).

24. Id. at 1082.
25. See, e.g., Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d
471 (1st Cir. 1964); Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1961).

26. 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), enforced sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
27. Id. at 925-26.
28. 375 U.S. 261 (1964).

29. Id. at 271 (quoting from International Harvester, 138 N.L.R.B. at 926).
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regards the scope of section 301 of the Act. In Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court approved the enforcement of an
agreement to arbitrate. The Court indicated that such agreements were a
"quid pro quo""1 for the no-strike clause and "that federal courts should
enforce these agreements" since they offered the best avenue for achieving
industrial peace.m
Added impetus was given to the arbitral process in a series of three
cases commonly referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy.' In these cases,
the Supreme Court announced what amounted to a hands-off policy concerning the review of an arbitrator's decision by the courts under section 301. Basically, courts were not to substitute their judgment for that
of the arbitrator. Even though a court might view the arbitrator's decision as an erroneous interpretation of the law or the facts, if the arbitrator's decision was drawn from the essence of the contract it was not to
be disturbed 3 4 The judicial inquiry should confine itself to deciding
whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction; that is, whether the subject
matter was arguably arbitrable.
Thus, between Spielberg in 1955 and Carey in 1964, the courts had
gone a long way toward indicating a predisposition favoring arbitration.
Some other hazy areas regarding the arbitration process and the interrelationship between the courts and the Board also had been resolved.
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,3 a doctrine of federal
pre-emption was enunciated. State and federal courts must defer to the
NLRB in matters arguably subject to sections 7 and 8 of the Act 3 It
was thought that perhaps this would deprive an individual of a section
301 action until the Board had decided to what extent an unfair labor
practice might exist. However, in Smith v. Evening News Association,3 7
30. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
31. Id. at 455.
32. Id.
33. The Steelworkers Trilogy consisted of United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 US. 574
(1960); and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp, 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
The cases will hereinafter be referred to collectively as Steelworkers Trilogy.
For a development of the Court's policy not to encroach on the arbitral process see
Zimmer, Wired for Colyer: Rationalizing NLRB and Arbitration Jurisdiction, 48 Ind.
LJ. 141, 143 et seq. (1973).
34. See 363 U.S. at 598.
35. 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
36. Cf. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 US. 95, 101-04 (1962), wherein it
was decided that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to enforce a
section 301 suit although federal case law would of course govern.
37. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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it was established conclusively that a suit under section 301 might be
maintained even if it involved questions of unfair labor practice.
With the Spielberg doctrine firmly entrenched and the courts showing
a decided favoritism for the arbitration process, the next logical step was
an extension of the Spielberg policy of deference to the ultimate policy,
finally adopted in Collyer, of outright deferral. Proponents of Collyer can
cite numerous cases from the early sixties to suggest that this is exactly
what transpired. For example, there were Hercules Motor Corp.8 in
1962, Dubo Manufacturing Corp.10 in 1963, and Modern Motor Express,
Inc.4" in 1964, all of which endorsed a policy of deferral. At the same
time, there were instances of the Board being rebuked by the courts
when it failed to defer. In the Fifth Circuit case of Sinclair Refining Co.
v. NLRB 41 and in the Ninth Circuit case of Square D Co. v. NLRB, 2
the courts refused to enforce Board orders regarding discovery in the
context of alleged section 8(a) (5) violations since the problem was under
consideration by an arbitrator. In other words, the appellate courts felt
that discovery should be compellable only if an arbitrator decided that
the subject matter of the dispute was arbitrable. Until such a determination was made, the Board was not to interject itself into contractual
determinations.
It might be assumed that there followed a proliferation of deferral
cases. However, one exhaustive study of the Board's deferral policy indicates that a non-deferral policy continued to prevail. 43 In fact, between
1960 and 1964 (the latter being the year in which Carey was decided),
the Board's average rate of deferral amounted to only a little over twentythree percent.4 4 Thus, the Board's deferral policy was at best an inconsistent one applied on an ad hoc basis.41 Further analysis reveals that
even ad hoc deferrals took a sharp decline after 1964, amounting to less
than twelve percent in the years 1965 through 1967.40
Further impetus for a non-deferral policy came from the Supreme
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

136 N.L.R.B. 1648, 1651 (1962).
142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963); see also 17 St. Louis U.L.J. 411, 414 (1973).
149 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1964).
306 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962).
332 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964).
Comment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 Yale L.J. 1191,

1219-21

(1968).
44. Id. at 1219 (1968).
45. Compare Timken Roller Bearing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 15 (1962), enforced, 325 F.2d
746 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964) (question of employer refusal to
issue wage data need not be deferred) with Insulation & Specialties, Inc., 144 N.L.RB.
1540 (1963) (Board deferring to arbitrator in bargaining unit dispute).
46. Comment, supra note 43, at 1220.
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Court cases of NLRB v. C & C Plywood47 and NLRB v. Acme Industrial
Co., 8 which together suggested that it was proper for the Board to
intervene in contractual disputes, notwithstanding contract provisions for
their handling. C & C Plywood had some similarities to the decision in
Smith v. Evening News Association 9 In Smith, the Supreme Court
indicated that section 301 rights need not be held in abeyance because
of possible unfair labor practice implications. In C & C Plywood, the
Court decided that the Board need not defer to the courts in an unfair
labor practice situation even when there were contractual implications,
especially in the absence of any arbitration provision. In Acme Industrial,
the Court, reversing earlier appellate precedent, allowed intervention by
the Board to direct the production of possibly relevant data before the
arbitrator had decided if the case was arbitrable. In both instances, the
Court was affirming a NLRB policy of interjecting itself into the contractual arena. °
The Board apparently took this as a cue to continue phasing out any
inclination to defer.5" For example, in Unit Drop Forge,12 the Board noted
jurisdiction even though arbitration was available, on the theory that
action was necessary because of an unduly long delay. One author indicates that, with the exception of Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,53 deferral
had virtually become extinct between 1968 and 1970.11 What, then,
brought about the results in Collyer which, based on the overwhelming
statistical data available, was in reality a radical departure from what
the Board had been doing between 1960 and 1970?
Aside from the obvious change in the political composition of the
Board, the Supreme Court's about-face in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local 77055 (in which it directly overruled a prior decision
of only eight years' standing),56 was undoubtedly a compelling factor
heralding a new era of deference to the arbitration process. The courts
always had had the authority to enjoin strike violence, but until Boys
47.
48.
49.
So.

385
385
371
See

US. 421
US. 432
U.S. 195
Zimmer,

(1967).
(1967).
(1962).
supra note 33, at 156-60 for a discussion of NLRB interjection into

the area of contractual interpretation.
51. Cf. Eastern III. Gas & Sec. Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 639 (1969); Producers Grain Corp.,
169 N.L.R.B. 466 (1968).
52. 171 NL.R.B. 600 (1968).
53. "17 I..R.B. 141 (1969). See note 17 infra for a discussion of the case.
54. See Comment, NLRB and Private Arbitration: Should Collyer Be Extended to EmployeeDiscipline Cases?, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1460, 1463 (1972).
55. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
56. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
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Markets the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act "7
had been thought to preclude interference with peaceful picketing. However, the Court was eager to create a national policy favoring the speedy
resolution of contractual differences over resort to economic warfare in
the form of a strike. Thus, the Court held that under section 301, a
peaceful strike can be enjoined where the contract contains no-strike and
arbitration clauses and a request to invoke available grievance procedures
has been met with refusal. 8 The courts have been liberal in their enforcement of the Boys Markets doctrine, to the point of implying a no-strike
clause where the contract did not expressly provide for it."
Clearly, this decision had an impact on the Board. The mandate for
deference to available grievance procedures first enunciated in Carey was
emphatically reiterated. If the courts, already overburdened, can see no
useful function in needless duplication of effort, the NLRB doubtless is
prompted by a similar consideration. It is not happenstance that in
Collyer we find Boys Markets cited prominently.00 After an erratic
history of deferral, the NLRB had decided to defer uniformly, and thus
promulgated the Collyer doctrine. We now turn to an examination of that
decision.
III.

Collyer

In Collyer, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
Board, alleging that the employer had violated sections 8(a)(5)1 and
8(a) (1) 12 of the National Labor Relations Act by making assertedly
unilateral changes in wages and working conditions.0 8 The employer
57. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
58.
59.
(N.D.
60.
61.

398 U.S. at 254.
E.g., Stein Printing Co. v. Atlanta Typographical Union No. 48, 329 F. Supp. 754, 758
Ga. 1971).
192 N.L.R.E. at 843.
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor prac-

tice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees" concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. 29

U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
62. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act declares it to be an unfair labor practice to Interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form,
join or assist labor organization, to bargain collectively and to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1970). "Accordingly, it has been held that violations of sub-sections (2), (3),
(4) and (5) are also violations of Section 8(a) (1)." A. Cox and D. Bok, Cases and Materials
on Labor Law 143-44 (1969).
63. The employer instituted an upward adjustment of wage rates for maintenance
employees, directed that the weekly maintenance of certain equipment be performed by
one machinist, rather than the usual team of two, and instituted a new incentive wage
rate for extruder operators. 192 N.L.R.B. at 837-38.
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claimed that he was empowered to make the changes under both the

existing collective bargaining agreement and the course of dealing under
that contract." Accordingly, the employer contended that the controversy
should be settled through the grievance-arbitration machinery provided
in the agreement as the exclusive forum for the adjustment of contractual
disputes.
Board Members Miller and Kennedy agreed with the employer's

contention since it was "essentially a dispute over the terms and meaning
of the contract between the Union and the [employer]."" The evidence

supported the Board's finding that "this dispute in its entirety [arose]
from the contract between the parties, and from the parties' relationship
under the contract .. . .,68 The breadth of the arbitration provision 1
demonstrated to the Board's satisfaction that "the parties intended to
make the grievance and arbitration machinery the exclusive forum for
resolving contract disputes.""8 The Board felt that this machinery "made
available a quick and fair means for the resolution of this dispute including . . . a fully effective remedy for any breach of contract which
occurred,"6 9 and that the Board's "obligation to advance the purposes of

the Act [could be] best discharged by the dismissal of this complaint.""0
"Recognizing the suitability of the special skill and experience of
arbitrators to resolve disputes such as this, the Board then discussed its
authority to defer to the arbitral process ... ."' It noted that its authority to do so had never been questioned by the courts, finding support in
64. "The contract provide~d] for a job evaluation plan and for the adjustment of rates,
subject to the grievance procedure, during the term of the contract. Throughout the bargaining relationship, [the employer] ha~d] routinely made adjustments in incentive rates to
accommodate new or changed production methods.' Id. at 837.
6S. Id. The following analysis borrows from that of NLRB General Counsel Peter G.
Nash, in his address entitled, First Questions from Collyer, before the FMCS-AAA Regional
Conference on Labor Arbitration, in Buffalo, N.Y., Oct. 15, 1971, in BNA Lab. ReL Y.B.1971, at 151, 152-53 [hereinafter cited as Nash Address].
66. 192 N.L.R.B. at 839.
67. The arbitration provision provided in part: "'All questions, disputes or controversies
under this Agreement shall be settled and determined solely and exclusively by the conciliation and arbitration procedures provided in this Agreement. . . .' A grievance is defined
as any controversy between an employee and his supervisor or any controversy between the
Union and the Respondent involving 'the interpretation, application or violation of any
provision of this agreement or supplement thereto.' The arbitration clause, article V, provides
that 'any grievance' may be submitted to an impartial arbitrator for decision and that the
decision of the arbitrator 'shall be final and binding upon the parties' if not contrary to
law." Id. The scope of the arbitration provision is broad enough to allow either party to
initiate a grievance proceeding.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Nash Address, supra note 65, at 152.
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the Carey Court's quotation7 2 of a Board statement made in International
Harvester Co.:
There is no question that the Board is not precluded from adjudicating unfair labor
practice charges even though they might have been the subject of an arbitration proceeding and award. Section 10(a) of the Act expressly makes this plain, and the

courts have uniformly so held. However, it is equally well established that the Board
has considerable discretion to respect an arbitration award and decline to exercise
its authority over alleged unfair labor practices if to do so will serve the fundamental
aims of the Act.

8

In addition, the Board noted that this judicial recognition of the discretion afforded the Board was consistent with the earlier case of Smith v.
Evening News Association, where the Supreme Court similarly had
observed that "'the Board has, on prior occasions, declined to exercise
its jurisdiction to deal with unfair labor practices in circumstances where,
in its judgment, federal labor policy would best be served by leaving the
parties to other processes of law.' ,,4
Turning to the legislative background, the Board noted the congressional policy in favor of the voluntary settlement of labor disputes
through the arbitral process. This policy finds specific expression in
section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, in which Congress declared:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.7 5

Furthermore, the Board relied 6 on the Supreme Court's affirmation of
that national policy in the Steelworkers Trilogy, which denotes the
arbitral forum as the primary arena for settlement of disputes arising
under section 301 of the LMRA.
While admitting that neither section 203 nor section 301 applies specifically to the Board, the majority contended that
"[T]he Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally important
Congressional objectives. Frequently the entire scope of Congressional purpose calls

for careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to another, and it is not too much
to demand of an administrative body that it77undertake this accommodation without
excessive emphasis upon its immediate task."1
72.

375 U.S. at 271.

73. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. at 925-26 (footnotes omitted).
74. 192 N.L.R.B. at 840 (quoting Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 198 n.6
(1962)).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
76. 192 N.L.R.B. at 840.
77. Id. n.7 (quoting Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942)).

1973]

NLRB DEFERRAL POLICY

The Board buttressed its position by citing the legislative history of the
Taft-Hartley amendment which, in its view, indicated that Congress
intended that mere breaches of collective-bargaining contracts should not
constitute unfair labor practices.7"
The Board referred to the contractual origin of the dispute in many
ways, 79 noting that "[t]he contract and its meaning in present circumstances lie at the center of this dispute."' 's But the contractual element
was identified more explicitly when the Board explained that the question of deferral arises "only when a set of facts may present not only an
alleged violation of the Act but also an alleged breach of the collectivebargaining agreement subject to arbitration.""' In enumerating the factors
favoring deferral, the Board said that in the Collyer dispute, which was
"one eminently well suited to resolution by arbitration,"8 2 "the Act and
its policies become involved only if it is determined that the agreement
between the parties, examined in the light of its negotiating history and
the practices of the parties thereunder, did not sanction Respondent's
right to make the disputed changes ... under the contractually prescribed
procedure."83
"In sum, the Board seems to have been referring to a dispute in which
issues of substantive contract interpretation would have to be resolved
against the respondent as a prerequisite to finding that the disputed
conduct violated the Act."' 4
The Board discussed its history of "accommodation between, on the
one hand, the statutory policy favoring the fullest use of collective bargaining and the arbitral process and, on the other, the statutory policy...
reflected by Congress' grant to the Board of exclusive jurisdiction to
prevent unfair labor practices."8 5 Continuing with this historical review,
78. At the time of the passage of the amendments, Congress rejected a proposal that
the Board be given the power to remedy breaches in collective bargaining agreements. See
.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1947). Congress apparently had anticipated
that the Board would "develop by rules and regulations a policy of entertaining under these
provisions only such cases . . .as cannot be settled by resort to the machinery established
by the contract itself, voluntary arbitration ...." S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sees. 23
(1947). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187 (1967): "[T]o remedy injuries arising out
of a breach of contract [is] a task which Congress has not assigned [the Board] ...
79. See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
80. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
81. Id. at 841.
82. Id. at 842.

83. Id.
84. General Counsel's Memorandum, Arbitration Deferral Policy Under Collyer, Feb. 28,
1972, at 4 n.4.
85. 192 N.L.R.B. at 841; Nash Address, supra note 65, at 152.
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the Board distinguished two lines of cases-those in which there was an
arbitral award and those in which no such award was made.
In the former class of cases, the Board asserted that it "has long given
hospitable acceptance to the arbitral process." 8 "In those cases in which
no award had issued,"' v the Board noted that its guidelines have been
less clear. "At times the Board has dealt with the unfair labor practice,
and at other times it has left the parties to their contract remedies." 88
Thus, "[f]he Board has continued to apply the doctrine enunciated in
Consolidated Aircraft, although not consistently."8
The Board concluded its historical review by summarizing and quoting
extensively from the "strikingly similar ' 90 Schlitz case,0" noting that
"[t]he circumstances of [Collyer], no less than those in Schlitz, weigh
heavily in favor of deferral. '0 2 In discussing these "circumstances," the
Board first noted that the parties had a long and productive bargaining
relationship in which they "mutually and voluntarily resolved the conflicts which inhere in collective bargaining."0 3 Second, "no claim is made
0 4
of enmity by [employer] to employees' exercise of protected rights,
the "'situation [is] wholly devoid of unlawful conduct or aggravated
circumstances of any kind,' ,,6 and the employer's action "'is not designed to undermine the UniQn.' "I" Third, the employer "credibly asserted its willingness to resort to arbitration,"'17 and "'urged the Union
to [arbitrate] their dispute.' "I8 Fourth, "the contract between [the
employer] and the Union unquestionably obligates each party to submit
to arbitration any dispute arising under the contract and binds both
parties to the result thereof," 9 and the contract arbitration provisions are
"unquestionably broad enough to embrace this dispute." 0 0 Fifth, "[t]he
86. 192 N.L.R.B. at 841, citing Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), and
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), enforcement denied, 161 F.2d 949
(6th Cir. 1947).

87. 192 N.L.R.B. at 841, citing Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943),
enforced in pertinent part, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944).
88. 192 N.L.R.B. at 841.
89. Id. See also Part II supra.
90. 192 N.L.R.B. at 841.
91. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969).
92. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842; Nash Address, supra note 65, at 152. The following analysis
is that of id. at 152-53.
93. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
94. Id.
95. Id. (quoting Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. at 142).
96. Id. at 841 (quoting Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. at 142).
97. Id. at 842.
98. Id. (quoting Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. at 142).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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contract and its meaning.., lie at the center of this dispute"10 1 which
involves "'substantive contract interpretation almost classical in its
form.' ,102 The disputed action "'is not patently erroneous but rather is
based on a substantial claim of contractual privilege,' "01 and each party
is "'asserting a reasonable claim in good faith.' ,,1o4 Sixth, "'arbitral
interpretation of the contract will resolve both the unfair labor practice
issue and the contract interpretation issue in a manner compatible with
the purposes of the Act,' "105 the Act becoming involved only if the
contract "did not sanction [employer's] right to make the disputed
changes."108 Finally, the question of contract sanction for employer's
action is a "threshold determination . . . [which] is clearly within the
expertise of a mutually agreed-upon arbitrator."10 7
The Board also pointed out the compatibility of its deferral for arbitration to be conducted in the future and its review, under its Spielberg
policy, of arbitration awards already rendered. 0 S
Finally, the Board rejected the contention of Member Fanning that its
decision instituted a form of "compulsory arbitration."10 9 This rejection
was grounded on the assertion that the Board was merely giving effect
to "voluntary agreements to submit all such disputes to arbitration, rather
than permitting . . . the substitution of our processes, a forum not
contemplated by [the parties'] own agreement."1 0 However, the majority
opinion avoided addressing the problem of whether the expiration of the
time limitation of the contract governing the filing for grievance-arbitration proceedings bears any relationship to the requirement that the
respondent be willing to arbitrate the dispute."' On the other hand,
dissenting Member Fanning clearly stated that "[t]he time limits for
the resolution of grievances with respect to these unilateral changes have
passed .... ,,"I It was based upon this fact, ignored by the majority,
that Member Fanning reasoned that, by compelling the arbitration of a
grievance no longer contractually arbitrable, the majority disposition of
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 NL.LB. at 142).
103. Id. at 841 (quoting Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. at 142).
104. Id. at 842 (quoting Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. at 142).
105. Id. at 841-42 (quoting Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. at 142).
106. Id. at 842.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 842-43; Nash Address, supra note 65, at 153.
109. 192 NT.LR.B. at 842. Member Fanning's dissent is treated at notes 125-46 infra
and accompanying text.
110. 192 NL.R.B. at 842.
111. General Counsel's Memorandum, Arbitration Deferral Policy Under Collyer, Feb. 28,
1972, at 6 n.11.
112. 192 N.L.RB. at 847 (Member Fanning, dissenting).
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the case "verges on the practice of compulsory arbitration."" 8 It thus
appears that the majority of the Board considered the question of time
limits on the filing of grievances to be irrelevant to its decision. Apparently, it was enough for the Board's purposes that the employer was
willing to arbitrate despite any time limitations contained in the contract.
By negative implication, had the Collyer employer attempted to stand
on its contract right to refuse arbitration on the grounds of untimeliness,
the Board probably would have proceeded to render a decision on the
merits of the alleged unfair labor practice.114 "Were the Board's decision
so viewed, it would suggest that contractual time limitations on the initiation of arbitration proceedings may be ignored; if a charge is timely filed
under the 6-month limitation of Section 10(b) of the Act, then the party
which seeks deferral for arbitration must waive any arbitration time
limitations which the contract may contain."1 15
As a final note, the Board reserved jurisdiction pending arbitration of
the dispute, to guarantee that "there will be no sacrifice of statutory rights
if the parties' own processes fail to function in a manner consistent
with the dictates of our law."" 16
As already noted, the Board quoted that portion of the Schlitz opinion
which suggested that an appropriate case for deferral to an arbitration
clause is one in which employer action is "not patently erroneous but
rather is based on a substantial claim of contractual privilege"'1 1 and in
8
which "each party [is] asserting a reasonable claim in good faith."1
The Board thus seemed to contemplate a contract claim which was
neither so compelling as to preclude any conflicting construction or so
unconvincing as to suggest bad faith on the part of its proponent. But
there remains a gap here:
[A] contract may be silent with respect to the tubject matter of a controversy, or

may seem on its face to preclude change; or the acting party may have depended upon
a general reserved rights clause to justify his initiative. In such a case, although an
arbitrator is not without authority and expertise to effectuate the intent of the con113. Id.
114. Nash Address, supra note 65, at 155.
115. Id.
116. 192 N.L.R.B. at 843. More specifically, "(in order to eliminate the risk of prejudice
to any party," the majority announced that it would: "[Rietain jurisdiction over this
dispute solely for the purpose of entertaining an appropriate and timely motion for further
consideration upon a proper showing that either (a) the dispute has not, with reasonable
promptness after the issuance of this decision, either been resolved by amicable settlement
in the grievance procedure or submitted promptly to arbitration, or (b) the grievance or
arbitration procedures have not been fair and regular or have reached a result which Is
repugnant to the Act." Id. (footnote omitted).
117.
118.

Id. at 841.
Id. at 842.
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tracting parties, the increased possibility that new, unbargained-for rights are at stake
19
will probably decrease the likelihood of deferral by the Board

Or, as pointed out by the concurring opinion in Collyer:
[A]rbitration properly serves the function of resolving differences about agreements
previously reached, and [is not] a means for the "acquisition of future rights";
arbitration [is not] a substitute for collective bargaining. 20

Member Brown, thus, would apparently require the Board to assure itself
that the dispute was "arguably arbitrable" before deferring to arbitration. In his view,
[t]he Board should not defer where the dispute is not covered by the contract and,

therefore, involves the acquisition of new rights. I would reach a different result where
the contract is ambiguous. In such a case a party may be exercising an accrued right,

and the party's action might be justified by the ultimate interpretation of the contract.
Thus, I would defer where a good-faith dispute over the interpretation or application
of a contract exists ... 121

Concentrating further on Member Brown's concurring opinion, it Will
be noted that one of the most significant elements of his analysis was the
expansive approach he suggested for future application of the Colyer
doctrine:
The deferral policy should be applied to disputes covered by the collectivebargaining agreement and subject to arbitration whether the disputes involve alleged
(3), or (1) or whether brought by the employer, the
violations of Section 8(a)(5),
22
union, or an employee.'
The principal opinion of the Board made no reference, even indirectly,
to section 8(a) (3) violations. Thus, the majority failed either to endorse
or to reject Member Brown's express suggestion. However, even he expressed some reservations about the application of the Board's deferral
policy in certain areas. In his opinion, "deferral would serve only a limited
purpose in representation cases" because "[r]epresentation proceedings
generally involve the very questions of whether there will be a collectivebargaining arrangement and, if so, to what extent."m Similarly, he would
be inclined not to defer "where there has been a repudiation of the collective-bargaining process. 11124
The Collyer majority opinion also engendered some strong dissents.
Member Fanning perceived the majority opinion as "a novel decision with
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

41 Fordham L. Rev. 175, 185 (1972).
192 N.L.RB. at 845 (Member Brown, concurring); 41 Fordham L. Rev. at 185.
192 N.L.R.B. at 845 (Member Brown, concurring) (footnotes omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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far-reaching implications."' s While acknowledging the contractual right
of the union or any of its members to institute grievance procedures, he
cogently discerned that "[n]o such grievances have been filed in this case
and there is no indication that the charging party or its members voluntarily desire[d] to do so. '' 120 In analyzing the actual agreement of the
parties, he found, contrary to the majority, that "the arbitration provision
does not make it clear that the parties intended ' . . . arbitration ...[to
be] the exclusive forum for resolving contract disputes,' ,127 but rather
that "the grievance procedure is 'subject to the rights of individual employees as provided for in the Labor-Management Act of 1947.' 1,128 He
raised the additional question, unanswered by the majority, as to whether
the parties were contemplating the loss of statutory rights when they
agreed to an arbitration clause with broad language, despite the absence
in the contract of any waiver clause.
In furtherance of his pronouncement that the majority opinion "verges
on the practice of compulsory arbitration," 12 9 he drew attention to the fact
that "[n]either Congress nor the courts have attempted to coerce the
parties in collective bargaining to resolve their grievances through arbitration."'3 0 He conceded that "[c]ollective-bargaining agreements ... give
aggrieved parties the right to file grievances and to present their disputes
to an arbitrator," but averred that "[t]he element of compulsion has been
deliberately omitted."''1 Consequently, he predicted the majority decision
will "discourage rather then [sic] encourage the arbitral process."' 82
To substantiate his position, Member Fanning relied on the decisions in
Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB,3 8 and H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,8 4 and
drew from the Supreme Court's opinion in the latter, where the Court
said:
[A]llowing the Board to compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable
to agree would violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is based-private
bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any
official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract.185
125. Id. at 846 (Member Fanning, dissenting).

126. Id.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 846-47 (Member Fanning, dissenting).
Id. at 847.
Id.

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 365
dissenting).
134. 397
senting).
135. 397

(emphasis in original).
U.S. 667 (1961), cited in Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 847 (Member Fanning,
U.S. 99 (1970), cited in Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 847 (Member Fanning, disU.S. at 108.
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He concluded this argument by stressing, in the traditional fashion, that
Congress is the appropriate body to establish a new policy in this area,
and he emphasized this point by stating that:
In Sections 8(b)(4)(D) and 10(k) Congress specifically provided that a "voluntary
method" for the adjudication of jurisdictional disputes was preferable to Board
intervention. No such preference has been indicated by Congress or the Supreme Court
for alleged violations of Section 8(a). 136

Turning to the majority's recognition of the special skill and experience
qualifying arbitrators to decide disputes arising under the bargaining relationship, Member Fanning contrarily concluded that "the Board, with the
help of its staff and Trial Examiner, has more expertise and is more competent to judge such a dispute in a manner to effectuate the policies of the
Act." 1 7 Moreover, relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in NLRB v.
Acme Industrial Co. 18 and Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,130 and
the Board's authority under section 10(a) of the Act, he asserted that the
Board stands in a different position vis-h-vis the arbitration process than
do the courts. It has superior authority to relieve unfair labor practice
violations, unlike the courts which are bound by the contract. 1 0
Reflecting on the Consolidated Aircraft Corp.' and Joseph Schlitz
Brewing Co.'1 cases, relied on by the majority as authority for deferring
to the arbitral process before arbitration has occurred, he emphasized that
the former case is "28 years old and its over-broad rationale ... has remained buried in the Board's history until resurrected in [Collyer],"'3
and that the latter case "was merely a question of contract interpretation
and the 'situation was wholly devoid of unlawful conduct or aggravated
circumstances of any kind.' ""Thus the impact of the majority's decision
may go beyond even compulsory arbitration since the decision means that
in the future the Board "will strip the parties of statutory rights merely
on the availabilityof [arbitration] ,45
136. 192 N.L.RB. at 847 (Member Fanning, dissenting).
137. Id. at 848.
138. 385 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1967), cited in Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 848 (Member Fanning, dissenting).
139. 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964), cited in Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 848 (Member Fanning,
dissenting).
140. See 192 N.L .B. at 848 (Member Fanning, dissenting).
141. 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943), enforced in pertinent part, 141 F.2d 78S (9th Cir. 1944),
cited in Collyer, 192 N.L..B. at 848 (Member Fanning, dissenting).
142. 175 N.L..B. 141 (1969), cited in Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 848 (Member Fanning,
dissenting).
143. 192 N.L.R.B. at 849 (Member Fanning, dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id. (emphasis in original).
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In concluding his dissent, Member Fanning attempted to elucidate the
limitations inherent in the employment of arbitrators. He found it understandable that "an arbitrator, paid jointly by a union and an employer to
adjudicate their private rights and obligations, may be unwilling to suggest that one of them is in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act
4
and to direct a remedy appropriate to such a finding.M 0
Member Jenkins initiated his dissenting opinion with a strident castigation of the majority's decision which he characterized as "a complete
reversal of Board precedent."'14 7 He substantiated this contention by citing, in a footnote, a litany of cases which demonstrably indicate that "[i]n
the period 1960-70, the Board has often decided the merits in 'unilateral
change of contract' cases, despite the availability of arbitration .... ,148
He further proclaimed that the Supreme Court's holding in Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge 49 was controlling precedent. In that case
the Supreme Court held that because "the preemption doctrine.., is designed to avoid conflicting regulation of conduct by various tribunals
which might have some authority over the subject matter, [the] Board
had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the case, and the state court was without jurisdiction."' ° Accordingly, he continued:
Thus it is plain that the principal ground on which the majority rests its remission

of this alleged violation of the Act to a different and private tribunal, namely, that
an interpretation of the contract is or may be necessary in resolving the issue, Is
explicitly and conclusively rejected by Lockridge...

If the Supreme Court is unwilling to give to state courts jurisdiction to decide
suits which "arguably" involve an unfair labor practice under the Act and at the
same time involve a contract interpretation issue, [thej Board can hardly relinquish
its paramount jurisdiction to a private tribunal or to an arbitrator .... 161

To further support his averment that "the preemption rationale of
Lockridge is a fortiori applicable to the [Collyer] case,' 5: 2 he turned to
section 9 (a) of the LMRA, which gives an employee the right to present
his grievance to the Board, apart from any grievance-arbitration remedies
available. Citing NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 58 an 8(b)
(1) (A) case, he discerned that "where unfair labor practices are alleged,
'other considerations of public policy come into play,' ... [which make]
146.

Id.

147. Id. at 850 (Member Jenkins, dissenting).
148. Id. n.32 and cases cited therein.
149. 403 U.S. 274 (1971), cited in Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 850 (Member Jenkins, dissenting).
150. 192 N.L.R.B. at 850 (Member Jenkins, dissenting).
151. Id. at 851.
152. Id. at 852.
153. 391 U.S. 418 (1968), cited in Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 852 (Member Jenkins,
dissenting).
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unimpeded access to the Board the only healthy alternative ....,"'In
light of this precedent, he deduced that the majority opinion is imposing
a sort of "waiver" of a statutory right-the right of access to the Boardand that this imposition is contrary to "[t] he standard rule ... enunciated
in numerous decisions of the Supreme Court,... and .. courts of [appeals] that the right to resort to the Board for relief against unfair labor
practices cannot be foreclosed by private contract." "5 Moreover, he asserted that Congress, in maintaining unfettered access to the Board by
means of section 14(c), had evinced an express interest in the Board's
protection of statutory rights. The Supreme Court has shown an equal
concern in Vaca v. Sipes."5 8

Further, Member Jenkins asserted that the majority's reliance on the
Schlitz case was misplaced. He denied that Schlitz stood for deferral to
arbitration, stating that "on the issue of arbitration, the majority in
Schlitz was opposed to deferral, and there was a majority only for the result of dismissal."'5 7
He also pointed out that arbitral procedures are becoming increasingly
expensive and lengthy.-5 8 For example, he noted that officials of the Steelworkers Union have "expressed their dissatisfaction with the high cost,
delays, and massive 'bogging-down' volume of arbitration, all of which
led to its use as a weapon against the union. Management dissatisfaction
with arbitration is likewise substantial."5 9 Lastly, he asserted that arbitration neither provides "an adequate remedy for violations of the Act" nor
effectively protects the public interest, and indeed "may sacrifice individual rights guaranteed by the Act because it is not available to aggrieved individuals."' 60
154. 192 N.L.R.B. at 852 (Member Jenkins, dissenting).
155. Id. at 852-53 (quoting Lodge 743, IAM v. United Aircraft Corp., 337 F2d 5, 8
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965)).
156. 386 U.S. 171, 181-83 (1967).
157. 192 N.L.TRB. at 853 (Member Jenkins, dissenting). The dispute in Schlitz involved
a change in the employees relief system, requiring all employees to break for lunch at the
same time. The two-member majority ruled that the issue was properly a matter for arbitration since the "situation [was] wholly devoid of unlawful conduct or aggravated drcumstances of any kind ....." 175 N.L.R.B. at 142. Member Jenkins concurred on the grounds
that the case should be dismissed on the merits. Id. (Member Jenkins, concurring). It is
difficult to agree with Member Jenkins's recollection of the Schlitz decision if one examines
the majority opinion in that case, which clearly seems to decide in favor of deferral.
158. 192 N.L.R.B. at 854.
159. Id. at 855 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Address by NLRB Chairman Edward B. Miller,
Conference of Western States Employer Association Executives, Aug. 27, 1971, in 78 Lab.
Rel.Rep. 28 (1971): "Ifwe make clear to the parties that we are not going to rescue them
from the imperfections of their own systems, we will encourage rather than discourage
them in taking necessary action to improve the prooesses which they will not be obliged
to follow without [the Board] serving as an easily available alternative." Id. at 32.
160. 192 N.L.R.B. at 855 (Member Jenkins, dissenting).
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It is interesting to note that the Collyer case did not result in binding
arbitration for the parties. Neither the union nor the company invoked the
grievance-arbitration procedures in their contract. "Instead, with the termination of their then current contract, the disputes which gave rise to
Collyer were cured by collective bargaining.., for the new contract. The
new agreement contains essentially the same provisions for grievance and
arbitration."'61
In sum, it is clear that the Collyer majority did consider its decision to
be an important policy statement on the question of Board involvement
in the area of contract administration; it declared that the decision
represents a developmental step in the Board's treatment of these problems and
the controversy here arose at a time when the Board decisions may have led the
parties to conclude that the Board approved
dual litigation of this controversy before
16 2
the Board and before an arbitrator.

IV. PosT-Collyer BOARD DECISIONS
Before turning to some recent cases that have interpreted and extended
Collyer, we should note that the Board itself has lent some assistance in
interpreting that decision. The General Counsel of the Board, whose duty
is to investigate and prosecute alleged violations of the Act, 1 8 has announced the general guidelines he intends to follow with "Collyerable"
cases in order to implement the Board's new deferral policy.'6 4 The unofficial comments made by Board Chairman Miller "5 within a week of
the Collyer decision offer perhaps the best indication of the policy implications of the case. Miller confirmed that "the decision makes clear that
[deferral] will be [the Board's] policy in similar cases in the future,"''x0
and characterized the case
as a break from precedent and an affirmative
67
change in Board policy.'
The most noticeable feature of the decisions issued by the Board since
Collyer is the seeming realization of the prophetic language uttered by
Member Brown in Collyer when he proclaimed: "The deferral policy
should be applied to disputes covered by the collective-bargaining agreement and subject to arbitration whether the disputes involve alleged
violations of Section 8(a) (5), (3), or (1) or whether brought by the employer, the union, or an employee.' 01 8 Post-Collyer decisions have sub161. 6 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 720, 733 (1972).
162. 192 N.L.R.B. at 843.
163. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970).
164. General Counsel's Memorandum, Arbitration Deferral Policy Under Collyer-Revised
Guidelines, Jan. 31, 1973.
165. Miller Address, supra note 159.
166. Id. at 33.
167. Id. at 35.
168. 192 N.L.R.B. at 845 (Member Brown, concurring).
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stantially extended and refined the original doctrine. Indeed, the Collyer
policy has now been expanded by the Board to apply to charges alleging
violations of sections 8(a) (1), 8(a) (2), 8(a) (3), 8(b) (1) (A), 8(b) (1)
(B), 8(b) (2), and 8(b) (3), as well as 8(a) (5).169 Besides this extension
in scope, post-Colyer cases have modified or entirely abrogated some of
the elements on which the Collyer Board had based its decision. We will
discuss a number of these in turn.
One of the key points emphasized by the Board in Collyer was that the
contract and its meaning were at the center of the dispute; that is, the
question of deferral arose only because the facts presented "not only an
alleged violation of the Act but also an alleged breach of the collectivebargaining agreement subject to arbitration."' 10 In more recent cases,
however, the Board has broadened the type of dispute which may be
deferred for arbitration. In National Radio Co.,171 the Board deferred
a complaint alleging violations of sections 8(a) (5) and 8(a) (3) of the
Act. The Board noted that the employer's deferral contention did not
"crest on any presumed primacy of an arbitrator to interpret an ambiguous
or contested contract provision."' 172 Nevertheless the Board accepted the
assumption, implicit in the employer's argument, that arbitration regarding the contractual provision limiting discipline to "just cause" would
lead to a resolution of the dispute not " 'repugnant to the purposes and
policies of the Act.' "'7 The Board found that the fundamental applicable
considerations were the same as those in Collyer: in both cases, the
"asserted wrong is remediable in both a statutory and a contractual
forum." 7 4 According to the Board, "[t]he crucial determinant [was]
... the reasonableness of the assumption that the arbitration procedure
will resolve [the] dispute in a manner consistent with the standards of
M7 5
Spielberg."
Subsequently, in Eastman Broadcasting Co.,m6 a case involving an alleged 8(a) (5) violation, the Board restated the Colmyer rule and declared
it to be applicable where two basic conditions have been met:
169. General Counsel's Memorandum, Arbitration Deferral Policy Under Collyer-Revised Guidelines, May 10, 1973, at 10.
170.

192 N.L.R.B. at 841.

171. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (July 31, 1972); see Note, The NLRB's Arbitration
Deferral Policy Under Collyer: The Impact of National Radio Co., 53 B.U.L. Rev. 711
(1973) for an in-depth analysis of the implications of the National Radio decision.
172.

198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 14-15.

173. Id. at 15 (footnote omitted).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 17.
176. 199 N.L.R.. No. 58 (Sept. 29, 1972).
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(1) the disputed issues are, in fact, issues susceptible of resolution under the operation
of the grievance machinery agreed to by the parties, and
(2) there is no reason for us to believe that use of that machinery by the parties
could not or would not resolve such issues in a manner compatible with the purposes
17 7
of the Act.

Under this test, it appears that a dispute over the meaning or application of contested substantive terms of the contract is not a prerequisite
to deferral under the Collyer policy. In the case of Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co.,178 for example, the trial examiner found that the employer
had violated sections 8(a) (5) and 8(a) (1) of the Act. Rejecting the employer's argument that the dispute should be resolved by the grievance
and arbitration provisions set up in the contract, he found that "'the contract does not deal with these issues' and that under the terms of the
contract 'the dispute is not one which either party is bound to arbitrate.' ,,179 On review the Board found merit in the employer's contention
and held Collyer to be applicable."1 0
In Great Coastal Express, Inc.,'' the Board ordered the deferral of a
complaint alleging an 8(a) (5) violation where the matter in dispute was
not specifically mentioned in the contract. There, the Board relied partially on the fact that the parties had in the past settled matters which,
although not expressly covered by the contract, had been brought up
under the "Maintenance of Standards" section of the agreement. Thus,
it was appropriate to defer to allow an arbitrator to interpret that section
to see if it covered the alleged unfair practice in the case. 8 2 Similarly, in
Bethlehem Steel Corp.,18s the trial examiner found the parties' contract
to be silent on subcontracting work. 8 4 In that case the employer justified
his subcontracting by noting that historically he had contracted out similar
work because the bargaining unit was not trained or qualified to do it.'
Although the employer could not point to any contract provision bearing
on the matter, the Board nevertheless deferred to arbitration under the
grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract. 8
However, if the Board determines that the alleged conduct may violate
the Act, it has refused to defer under the Collyer policy, notwithstanding
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 12.
198 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (July 31, 1972).
Id. at 5.
Id.
196 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (May 2, 1972).
Id. at 4.
197 N.L.R.B. No. 121 (June 21, 1972).
Id., Trial Examiner's Decision at 12.
Id. at 4.
197 N.L.R.B. No. 121, at 2.
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the contract
provisions. In Local 17, Sheet Metal Workers' International,"1 7 the provisions of the contract appeared to allow the union to
strike to protest a supervisor's working at less than the rates set for foremen by the contract. The Board concluded that since this kind of conduct
violated section 8 (b) (1) (B) notwithstanding the contract provisions, and
since the arbitrator would decide only the question of contract privilege,
the Board would be required to decide at least part of the dispute.8's
Therefore, the Board refused to defer, stating:
When an entire dispute can adequately be disposed of under the grievance and
arbitration machinery, we are favorably inclined toward permitting the parties an
opportunity to do so. One of our reasons for so doing is to avoid litigating the
same issues in a multiplicity of forums. But here, since we must perforce determine
a part of the dispute, there is far less compelling reason for not permitting the
entire dispute to be resolved in a single proceeding. 189

Another consideration noted by the Board in Collyer was the duration
and general quality of the disputants' bargaining relationship. The Collyer
Board spoke of the parties' "'established and successful bargaining relationship' ,,0 which had been "long and productive."-' Similarly, in
Appalachian Power Co., 92 the Board dismissed an 8(a)(3) complaint
contending that the trial examiner's finding of union hostility was overdrawn in light of the "[employer's] long history of bargaining with the
Union."' 98 This case apparently reaffirmed the Board's conviction, espoused in Collyer, that the duration of the parties' relationship should be
considered in deciding whether to defer.'9 4
But in other decisions, the Board has indicated that the short duration
of the bargaining relationship will not, of itself, preclude deferral of the
complaint. In Coppus Engineering Corp.,' 5 the union was certified in
August 1969 and after twenty to twenty-five bargaining sessions, the
parties executed a collective-bargaining agreement in December 1969.111
The union filed an unfair labor practice complaint, alleging an 8(a) (5)
violation, in May 1970. The Board dismissed the complaint, preferring
187. 199 N.LJR.B. No. 26 (Sept. 20, 1972).
188. Id. at 8. But d. Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 44, at I n.1
(Oct. 2, 1972).
189. 199 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 9.
190. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842 (citation admitted).
191. Id.
192. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (July 31, 1972).
193. Id. at 10.
194. Likewise, in National Radio Co., the Board deferred the dispute to arbitration,
brushing aside current strike activity partially because of the parties' history of "a stable
and productive bargaining relationship." 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 20 (footnote omitted).
195. 195 N.L.RLB. 595 (1972).
196. Id.
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instead to defer to the voluntary arbitration machinery provided for
in the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. 0 7 Likewise, in L.E.M.,
I., 9 8 the Board deferred a complaint alleging violations of sections 8(a)
(1), 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (5) of the Act, although the disputes arose a short
time after the parties had entered into their first collective-bargaining
agreement. 99
The extent to which evidence of over-reaching or anti-union animus will
influence the Board in future dismissals is debatable. In Collyer the Board
noted that "no claim is made of enmity by [the employer] to employees'
exercise of protected rights,"" e the "'situation [is] wholly devoid of unlawful conduct or aggravated circumstances of any kind' 11201 and the
employer's action "'is not designed to undermine the Union.' 2o2 Later
cases have been inconsistent on this point. For example, in National Radio Co., 20 3 a single, animus-motivated unfair labor practice was not enough
to make deferral inappropriate. The National Radio Board did note that
the allegation of animus "add [s] a dimension to this case which was not
present in Collyer, where no claim was made that [the employer] acted
from a desire or with an intent either to abridge Section 7 rights, or to
penalize employees for their exercise of those rights. 20 4 The Board nevertheless concluded that its jurisdiction over the controversy was asserted
improvidently prior to the issuance of the arbitrator's award, and so deferred. 0 5 On the other hand, in Chase Manufacturing,Inc., °0 the Board
affirmed the trial examiner's findings of 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5) violations
and rejected the deferral procedure, stating:
197.

Id. at 597.

198.

198 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Aug. 4, 1972).

199. Id. at 7.
200. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
201. Id. (citation omitted).
202. Id. at 841 (citation omitted).
203. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (July 31, 1972).
204. Id. at 11.
205. Similarly, in Appalachian Power Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (July 31, 1972), the
Board refused to adopt the trial examiner's findings that the employer "entertained antiunion hostility and that such entered into the decision to cancel [the employee's] leave,"
thereby violating section 8(a)(3). Id. at 7-8. It concluded that, "viewed In the light of
[employer's] long history of bargaining with the Union, [employer's activity] can hardly
be characterized as displaying a deep-seated animus to its employees' union representation
or disregard for its employees' statutory rights." Id. at 10-11. Apparently, the Board may
evaluate allegations of enmity in future cases in light of the total bargaining history of
the parties, including the duration and effectiveness of the bargaining relationship and
character and frequency of unfair labor practices. See notes 190-99 supra and accompanying
text for a discussion of the relevancy of the history of the parties' bargaining relationship
to the question of deferral.
206. 200 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (Dec. 13, 1972).
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the issue before us is not limited to the propriety of remedying a breach of contract,
but rather one that concerns [employer's] complete rejection of the
principles of
207
collective bargaining, and the self-organizational rights of employees.

In United Aircraft Corp., 8 the Board rejected a finding that the employer's history of unfair labor practices, including those in the case be-

fore it, demonstrated continuing enmity toward its employees' exercise of
rights protected by the Act. The administrative law judge had concluded
that deferral to arbitration was inappropriate and, indeed, precluded by
the Board's doctrine in Collyer. In reversing the decision below, the Board
majority continued to acknowledge the importance of exploring the nature
of the relationship between the parties. However, the majority concluded,
in a departure from the original Collyer doctrine, that
the nature and scope of the acts currently alleged to show such hostility, together with
a measure of the current impact of any past such acts, must all be evaluated and
then together be weighed against evidence as to the developing or maturing nature
of the parties' collective-bargaining relationship and proven effectiveness (or lack
thereof) of the available grievance and arbitration machinery. Upon a totality of
those facts, it must then be determined whether the parties' agreed-upon grievance
and arbitration machinery can reasonably be relied on to function properly and to
20 9
resolve the current disputes fairly.

Applying this standard, the Board was willing to overlook the administrative law judge's findings of a history of enmity. Relying heavily on the
employer's recent compliance with two arbitrators' awards, the Board
reaffirmed its policy enunciated in National Radio Co., and concluded:
But if . . . there is now effective dispute-solving machinery available, and if the
combination of past and presently alleged misconduct does not appear to be of such
character as to render the use of that machinery unpromising or futile, then we ought
2 10
not depart from our usual deferral policies.

United Aircraft implies that the Board's Collyer standard may have
given way to a more flexible policy favoring private adjustments unless
countervailing negative factors seriously threaten to undermine the successful use of the arbitral process. In adopting this relaxed deferral standard, the United Aircraft majority took the occasion to enunciate their
underlying concern with the Board's ever-increasing caseload, by stating:
Being keenly aware of the limited resources of this Agency, we are not particularly
desirous of inviting any labor organization, particularly one representing employees
in so large a context as this, to bypass their own procedures and to seek adjudication
by this Board of the innumerable individual disputes which are likely to arise in the
207. Id. at 2. See North Shore Publishing Co., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Sept 2, 1973);
Mountain State Constr. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (June 1, 1973).
208. 204 N.L.R.B. No. 133 (July 10, 1973).

209. Id. at 3.
210. Id.
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day-to-day relationship . . . When a labor organization seeks instead to have us
resolve each such dispute, we think it proper to require it, before invoking our
services, initially to invoke the available voluntary machinery.
With the ever-increasing caseload, it is more important than ever that the Board
be permitted to husband its limited resources and apply them where they have
maximum impact in effectuating the Act.21 '

Members Fanning and Jenkins, in a vigorous dissent 12 to United Aircraft Corp., characterized the majority's disposition of the case as a
demonstration that "[t]he justification used to support [the Board's]
Collyer policy is simply meaningless rhetoric to be ignored when the facts
do not fit the mold."2 18
Certainly one of the other factors which influenced the Board's decision
in Collyer was its finding that "the contract between [employer] and the
Union unquestionably obligates each party to submit to arbitration any
dispute arising under the contract and binds both parties to the result
thereof.1214 In addition, the breadth of the arbitration provision satisfied
the Board that "the parties intended to make the grievance and arbitration machinery the exclusive forum for resolving contract disputes. 215 In
fashioning guidelines for subsequent application of the Collyer doctrine
by the regional offices, the Board's General Counsel therefore provided:
[Amn unfair labor practice charge will not be deferred for arbitration under the

Collyer policy unless the contract provides that the procedures culminating in binding
arbitration shall be the exclusive means for settlement of the disputes underlying
216
the charge.

Yet the evolution of the post-Collyer cases demonstrates a significant
departure from the Board's strict approach to the question of "exclusiveness" of the arbitral forum. It may well substantiate the perception of
Board Member Fanning who, in his Collyer dissent, prognosticated:
The impact of the majority's decision may be said to go beyond compulsory arbitra211.

Id. at 6-7 (quoting Local 76, Am. Fed'n of Musicians, 202 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (Mar. 21,

1973)).
212. Id. at 10.
213. Id. The same two Board members made a similar point in their dissent in Columbus
& Southern Ohio Elec. Co., 83 L.R.R.M. 1558 (1973): "Such unpredictability and lack of
uniformity in deferring to arbitrators the decision on violations of the Act fails to guide or
inform, and only confuses, those attempting to apply our decisions to their circumstances."
83 L.R.R.M. at 1561 (Members Fanning & Jenkins, dissenting).
214. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
215. Id. at 839. The arbitration clause provided that all disputes arising under the
contract "'shall be settled and determined solely and exclusively by the conciliation and
arbitration procedures . . . .'" Id.
216. General Counsel's Memorandum, Arbitration Deferral Policy Under Collyer,
Feb. 28, 1972, at 10.
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tion. For it means that in the future the Board will not concern itself with the fact
or the regularity of the arbitral process, but will strip the parties of statutory rights
merely on the availability of such a procedure.217

For example, in Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc.,218 the Board stated that
dismissal of the 8(a) (1) complaint was in order because "[t]his short and
plain dispute emphasizes the fundamental soundness of our growing practice to abstain from action where grievance and arbitration procedures
are available to resolve a dispute equally cognizable in either forum?' 9
Moreover, in setting out the "crucial determinant" and the "two basic conditions" for deferral in National Radio Co. and Eastman Broadcasting
Co. respectively, the Board did not mention the exclusivity of the contract arbitration procedures as one of the criteria necessary for deferral.
Rather, in National Radio Co., the Board merely emphasized the "reasonableness of the assumption that the arbitration procedure will resolve
[the] dispute,"220 and, in Eastman BroadcastingCo., it called for deferral
where "the disputed issues are.., susceptible of resolution""' under the
contract grievance machinery. If, however, the contract between the parties does not expressly provide for the resolution of disputes by arbitration, the 2Board as yet has not decided to defer the unfair labor practice
22
charge
The development of the Board's deferral policy in this area has been
expressly acknowledged by the Board General Counsel in the new Collyer
guidelines,' m wherein it is stated:
It seems clear... that the Board predicates deferral on the availability of grievancearbitration procedures in otherwise suitable circumstances and not on any express or
implied agreement of the parties to employ only those procedures in the settlement
224
of their disputes.
217. 192 N.L.R.B. at 849 (Member Fanning, dissenting).
218. 199 N.,LR.B. No. 44 (Oct 2, 1972).
219. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
220. 198 N.L..B. No. 1, at 17.
221. 199 N.L.R.B. No. 58, at 12.
222. See, e.g., Machinists Dist. 10, 200 N.L.R.B. No. 165 (Dec. 29, 1972), where the Board
denied the union's motion, predicated on Collyer, to dismiss the charge and to defer to the
grievance provisions in the contract. The Board emphasized that the contract did not provide
for arbitration and, therefore, it was unnecessary to decide whether Collyer was applicable. Id.
at 4 n.4. Cf. Tulsa-Wisconsin Funeral Homes, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (Jan. 26, 1972),
enforced, No. 72-1251 (10th Cir., July 12, 1973) where the Board refused to defer because
the contract provided for arbitration only upon the mutual assent of the parties. "Here,"
the Board said, "whenever the [employer] denies a grievance at the final step, the contract
binds no one to any further procedure for peaceful resolution of the dispute." Id. at I n.1.
223. General Counsel's Memorandum, Arbitration Deferral Under Collyer-Revised
Guidelines, May 10, 1973.
224. Id. at 27 n.37.
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But once the Board determines that arbitration is available under the
contract, it still remains necessary to decide whether the parties have contractually undertaken to arbitrate the kind of dispute which is the subject
of the unfair labor practice charge; put another way, to warrant deferral,
the subject matter of the dispute under consideration must be included
in the issues which the contract makes arbitrable. 22 This leads us to a
consideration of how broadly post-Collyer cases have construed those
parts of arbitration agreements which enumerate the proper subjects for
arbitration. In Collyer, the Board merely stated without further analysis
that the arbitration clause was "unquestionably broad enough to embrace
[the] dispute. 22 6 In subsequent cases, the Board has liberally interpreted
what disputes may be arbitrable under the terms of a specific grievance
7
contract.2
Further, the Board has continued to make it clear that the passage of
the time limits for the filing of grievance proceedings, as occurred in
Collyer,221 will not bar deferral. For example, in Urban N. Patman,
Inc., 9 the trial examiner in finding an 8(a) (5) violation, concluded that
the Board could not defer to arbitration because, inter alia, "the grievance
provisions [require] that an employee must file a grievance in order for
the dispute to proceed to arbitration, and no such grievance was filed in
this case .... ,,210 The Board reversed, finding that "the filing of a grievance is not a prerequisite to deferral for, in the lead case of Collyer, no
such grievance had been filed." ''
A corollary consideration elicited by the Board in Collyer was that the
225. "For arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit
to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." Steelworkers Trilogy,
363 U.S. 564, 582 (1960).
226. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
227. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (July 31, 1972); Wrought
Washer Mfg. Co., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (May 24, 1972); Norfolk, Portsmouth Wholesale
Beer Distribs. Ass'n, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 165 (May 19, 1972); Great Coastal Express, Inc.,
196 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (May 2, 1972). But cf. Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B.
No. 44 (Oct. 2, 1972), where the Board refused deferral of one portion of the complaint, In
part because it did not "clearly appear that the incident complained of . . . could form
the basis for a grievance cognizable under the contract" and "there [was] no showing that
the arbitrator would have any authority, under the contract, to consider or remedy [the
violation alleged]." Id. at 5.
228. In Collyer, Member Fanning's dissent noted that "the time limits [for filing grievances] have passed." 192 N.L.R.B. at 847 (Member Fanning, dissenting). See text accompanying notes 111-15 supra.
229. 197 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (June 30, 1972), appeal docketed sub nom. Provision House
Workers, Local 274 v. NLRB, No. 72-2617 (9th Cir., Oct. 24, 1972).
230. Id. at 3.
231. Id.
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employer "credibly asserted its willingness to resort to arbitration."'
This same "willingness to have the dispute resolved in this manner" was
likewise noted by the Board in Coppus Engineering Corp.2Y- Moreover,
in Collyer, the Board provided a safeguard against procrastination or
intransigeance on the part of the respondent in submission to arbitration
evidencing an unwillingness to arbitrate. In such situations the Board retains jurisdiction over the dispute for the purpose of entertaining a timely
motion showing that "the dispute has not, with reasonable promptness
...been resolved by amicable settlement in the grievance procedure or
submitted promptly to arbitration ... ."2 Thus, the Board has a "club in
the closet" which it will use to revoke deferral and to issue a decision on
the merits in the event that a prompt submission is defeated by respondent's unwillingness to arbitrate.
In Medical Manors, Inc.,2 3 5 for example, the Board admonished the
respondent that jurisdiction was being retained "against the contingency
that respondent might engage in further foot-dragging in such manner that
0
the disputes in issue are not promptly submitted to arbitration."21
A final criterion for deferral recognized by the Board in Collyer was
the special skill and experience qualifying arbitrators to decide disputes
arising under the bargaining relationship. The importance of this criterion
has been demonstrated in post-Collyer cases, by the Board's deferral on
27
issues that are primarily statutory.
As noted at the outset of the discussion of the post-Collyer cases, Member Brown, in his concurring opinion, favored a more expansive deferral
policy. Nevertheless, he expressed serious reservations about surrendering
bargaining unit determinations to private parties and applying the Collyer
principle to representation cases." 8 The Board apparently has heeded
this caveat thus far, holding that accretion issues are not suitable for
deferral under Collyer. In Combustion Engineering, Inc.,2 the Board
rejected the contention that employees of a newly established facility had
been accreted to an existing bargaining unit and thus covered by the
existing agreement. In doing so, the Board stated:
232.
233.

192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
195 N.L.R.B. 595, 602 (1972).

234. 192 N.L.R.B. at 843.
235. 199 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (Oct. 9, 1972).
236. Id. at 6 n.2.
237. See, e.g., Associated Press, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 168 (Oct. 27, 1972); L.E.M, Inc.,
198 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Aug. 4, 1972); National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (July 31,
1972); Bethlehem Steel Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 121 (June 21, 1972); Norfolk, Portsmouth
Wholesale Beer Distribs. Ass'n, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 165 (May 19, 1972).
238. 192 N.L.R.B. at 845.
239. 195 N.L.LB. 909 (1972).
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With respect to the award of the arbitrator, the question of whether the existing
contract was intended, or can be construed, to cover those employees at [the new
plant] who were hired after its effective date is a question for the arbitrator, but his
conclusion on that issue does not govern or guide the Board in its disposition of the
issue presented here. For . . . it is nevertheless the obligation of the Board to

the employees at [the new plant] constituted an accretion to the
determine whether
240

existing unit.

However, a more recent case may signal a change in the Board's attitude. In Champlin Petroleum Co.,241 the Board affirmed the administrative
trial judge's decision deferring alleged violations of sections 8(a) (3) and
8(a) (1) of the Labor Management Relations Act although the controversy involved the issue of "whether the warehouse employees may be
considered an accretion to the bargaining unit. ' 242 Conceding that the
Board's expressed reservation about relegating unit determinations to
private parties posed a problem, the administrative law judge nevertheless
had concluded:
The Board, however, has given no indication that it would not honor a unit determina-

the contract if such
tion arrived at by means of application or interpretation
243 of
determination were consistent with Board law or policy.

Whether the Collyer doctrine has advanced into the accretion area may
be determined in the near future.
The preceding discussion which has highlighted some of the postColtyer Board cases attempted to indicate the direction in which the
Board is moving and the approach which it has taken on the fundamental
issues emerging from Collyer. A review of the cases pending in various
courts may further clarify the course that Collyer will follow.
V.

PosT-Collyer APPELLATE REviEW

The first case to seek judicial review of the Collyer doctrine was CWA
v. NLRB. 244 In CWA, the union, believing that changes in the pay scale
violated section 8(a) (5), filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
Board and went on strike. 45 Prior to the resolution of the charges by the
Board, management sought,246 and on appeal was granted, a Boys Mar240.

Id. See also Machinists Dist. 10, 200 N.L.R.B. No. 165 (Dec. 29, 1972).

241. 201 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (Jan. 8,1973).
242.
242.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.

244. Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB, No. 72-1761 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 23, 1973) (per curtan).
Although this was the first case to be argued, it was not the first in which a decision was
rendered; see discussion infra at note 325 et seq.
245. Brief for Respondent at 2-9, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB.
246. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. CWA, 324 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Tex.), rev'd, 454 F.2d
1333 (5th Cir. 1971).
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kets injunction by the Fifth Circuit which directed the parties to arbitrate.241 Faced with this decision, the Board deferred to the arbitrator.24 8
Challenging the Board's deferral, the union noted the discrepancy between numerous instances in which the doctrine of deferral had been
invoked24 9 and the Collyer majority's original modest assessment of the
scope of the doctrine. 25 0 Addressing itself to the original Wagner Act of
1935, the union then argued that the deletion of a deferral clause from
section 10(b), as originally drafted, manifested clear congressional intent
to reject any policy of Board deferral.2 51 Reference also was made to section 14(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act which provides in
pertinent part: "[t]hat the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction
over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the
standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959."2-'5 The union further contended that because section 10(k) of the Act regarding jurisdictional disputes specifically contains deferral language, deferral in unfair labor
practice cases is necessarily excluded. 53
As precedent the union cited the recent case of Motor Coach Employees
v. Lockridge,l which upheld the policy of federal pre-emption in the field
of labor law spelled out in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmo 2 55 some twelve years earlier. If Lockridge had the effect of preempting the field of unfair labor practice violations, then the Board alone
would be able to address itself to situations in which there was a plausible
inference of an unfair labor practice. However, the union did not urge
such a strong interpretation, but argued instead that Lockridge was merely
indicative of a policy favoring the use of NLRB expertise in this area.
The union glossed over H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 5- 6 which precludes
the Board from rewriting a deficient collective bargaining agreement, and
spent more time elaborating on UAW v. NLRB. 251 The union urged that
this latter case strongly supported the proposition that the NLR.B can
neither defer nor refuse to act. 25 8 Turning then to what it labeled the
247. 454 F.2d at 1337.
248. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 6, at 5-6 (Aug. 4, 1972).
249. Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB.
250. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842-43.
251. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB.

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
sions).
258.

29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1970).
Brief for Petitioner at 15, Local 6222, CVA v. NLRB.
403 U.S. 274 (1971).
359 U.S. 236 (1959).
397 U.S. 99 (1970).
455 F.2d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (NLRB must set forth the reasons for its deciThis case is referred to by the union in its brief as NLRB v. Udylite Corp.
Brief for Petitioner at 23, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

"mystique of arbitration, ' 25 9 the union catalogued the evils inherent in
arbitration 2 10-including the thrusting of a complainant into the hands of
incompetents whose sole qualification for sitting in judgment is their
acceptability to the parties; the lack of enforcement power; the lack of
stare decisis; and the preclusion of judicial review. In conclusion the union
urged that Collyer was heralding a new era of confusion and disorder for
those seeking some semblance of uniformity in the process of collectivebargaining enforcement.
In its response to the union's brief, the Board concentrated initially on
rebutting the union's assertion that entrusting decisions to arbitrators is
in derogation of its responsibility, amounting to turning loose on the public an unmanageable horde of ad hoc rule-makers. Quoting from Collyer2 l'
and the Steelworkers Trilogy,2 2 the Board observed that the special skill
of an arbitrator in resolving a contractual conflict is the most desirable
means of performing the will of the parties. The Board then focused its
attention on the language of the Labor Management Relations Act in support of its contention that it has the authority to defer 208 The thrust of
the Board's argument was that, although the Board cannot be displaced
by another body, the Taft-Hartley amendments (specifically sections 301
and 203(d)), and the language of section 14(c) encourage rather than
preclude deferral. 4 In support of this argument, the Board cited Carey v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.,261 in which the Supreme Court indirectly
approved the well established Spielberg doctrine. As additional support,
the Board enumerated various instances in which it had deferred over the
years, including Dubo Manufacturing Co.216 Concluding with some policy
arguments favoring deferral-it obviates the dangers resulting from a multiplicity of rulings, affords a welcome reduction in caseload, and promotes
industrial peace 217-the Board asked that Collyer be received with warm
acceptance as a logical extension of the Spielberg doctrine.20 8
259.

Id. at 27; 192 N.L.R.B. at 856 (Member Fanning dissenting).

260.

Brief for Petitioner at 28-29, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB.

261.

See Brief for Respondent at 11-12, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB. "[D]isputes such as

these can better be resolved by arbitrators with special skill and experience in deciding
matters arising under established bargaining relationships than by the application by the
Board of a particular provision of our statute." 192 N.L.R.B. at 839.
262. Brief for Respondent at 14-15, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB.
263. Id. at 18-19.
264. See Brief for Respondent at 13-14, 18-19, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB. Section 203(d)
provides: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the

desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or Interpretation
265.
266.
267.
268.

of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964).
142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963).
Brief for NLRB at 33-35, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB.
Id. at 36.
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Despite the issues presented in the opposing briefs, the facts in CWA
militated against a definitive judicial pronouncement on the Collyer doctrine. As noted above, in granting an injunction, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit had directed the parties to arbitrate. 01 The arbitration
proceedings were pending at the time the Board issued its deferral'-" and
were concluded prior to oral argument on the appeal from that deferral.
In Dubo Manufacturing Corp.,2 71 the Board deferred after arbitration
had already begun. In CWA the arbitrator actually rendered a decision
on July 3, 1973 while that case was still under consideration by the court.
Thus the court in CWA also was obliged to consider Smith v. Evening
News Association,2 72 approving enforcement of an arbitrator's award in
which potential unfair labor practice issues were resolved, as well as the
long standing precedent of Spielberg. Clearly, the Collyer issues were
blurred sufficiently to make any statement by the court of doubtful precedential value. It did not come as a complete surprise, therefore, that the
court, upon the motion of the petitioner, remanded the case to the Board
without rendering any decision.2 7 What is noteworthy is the court's comment that it was remanding the case "for further consideration under the
jurisdiction which the Board has purported to retain."- 4 The court appears to be harboring some doubts about the jurisdictional aspects of
Collyer, astutely avoided by the parties themselves.
Another Collyer case pending before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB.2 "7 Although similar
to CWA in that it was triggered by the Board's deferral of issues involving alleged section 8(a) (5) violations,2 70 neither court orders nor
arbitral proceedings have intervened in IBEW to cloud the Collyer issue.
Petitioner in IBEW argued that by favoring a policy of arbitration
the Board misconstrued the congressional intent underlying the Labor
Management Relations Ac 2 77 Noting that language favoring arbitration
did not appear in Title I of the Act where unfair labor practices were
discussed, but only in Title II (section 203(d)), petitioner urged that
this indicated a congressional intent to limit deferrals to the area of con269.

See note 247 supra and accompanying text.

270.

198 N.L.R.B. No. 6, at 13-14.

271.

142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963).

272.

371 U.S. 195 (1962).
CWA v. NLRB, No. 72-1761 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 23, 1973)

273.

(per curiam).

274. Id.
275. Nos. 72-1994, 72-1995 (D.C. Cir., filed Oct. 20, 1972) wherein the IBEW has consolidated two companion cases which, while different on the facts, confront the Collyer
problem head on.
276. Brief for Petitioner at 1-16, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB.
277. Id. at 22.
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tract enforcement (Titles II and III).278 The area of unfair labor practice, petitioner contended, has been pre-empted from arbitration by section 10(a) of the Act. 79
Petitioner found support for this interpretation of congressional intent
in a brief submitted by the Board in NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp.80
There, the Board argued:
As the present case shows, contract defenses to unfair labor practice charges frequently may not be judged merely as abstract questions of contract law, disassociated
from statutory considerations ....
The decision of such a question cannot properly be made without bringing to bear
a full appreciation of the scope and tradition of the statutory right alleged to have
been waived, matters
as to which the Board has been entrusted with primary statutory
responsibility.28 '
Nor, petitioner argued, is such an interpretation inconsistent with Boys
Markets where the Court noted that the "very purpose of arbitration
procedures is to provide a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of
industrial disputes without resort to strikes, lockouts or other self-help
measures. ' 28 2 Emphasizing that the courts have limited the role of an
arbitrator "to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining
agreement; ... [and not to dispensation of] his own brand of industrial
justice,"' 2" petitioner contended that deferral in unfair labor practice
situations was neither intended by Congress nor condoned by the courts.
Assuming arguendo the validity of Collyer, petitioner distinguished
IBEW on the ground of "willingness to resort to arbitration. 2 8 Noting
that the parties in IBEW did not enter into an agreement specifically
precluding Board review,2 85 petitioner argued that relegating the parties
to arbitration was in effect a rewriting of the agreement, a practice
proscribed by H.K. Porter Co. 21 6 Even if the parties had entered into
such an agreement, petitioner contended that it could not prevent the
278. Id. at 22-23.

279. Id. at 23.
280. 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
281. Brief for NLRB, NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., quoted in Brief for Petitioner
at 18, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB.
282. 398 U.S. 235, 249 (1970).
283. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960).
284. Brief for Petitioner at 54-55, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB. "We are not compelling
any party to agree to arbitrate disputes arising during a contract term, but are merely
giving full effect to their own voluntary agreements to submit all such disputes to arbitration,
rather than permitting such agreements to be sidestepped and permitting the substitution of
our process, a forum not contemplated by their own agreement." 192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
285. Brief for Petitioner at 29-30, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB.
286. 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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Board's assumption of jurisdiction, citing the interpretation of section
10(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act in Lodge 743, IAM v.
United Aircraft Corp.187 As further support, petitioner quoted the
NLRB's brief in C & C Plywood Corp., where, reflecting on the language
of an earlier case,288 the Board commented: "[t]he Court, however, did
not suggest that the Board might-and it certainly did not intimate that
it must-decline jurisdiction merely because of the possibility of a co28
existing arbitral or judicial remedy."
Petitioner went on to suggest that: parties less financially sound will
be loathe to indulge in the luxury of enforced arbitration; - 1 the system
will break down if so rudely overburdened;911 and arbitrators are hardly
competent to wrestle with weighty statutory matters.2 2 Petitioner continued that at least one court has noted greater perception at the Board
level, afforded by a broad overview of the system.29 3 There was further
criticism that arbitrators lack the statutory authority for enforcement
vested in the Board.2 94 Furthermore, considerable time is lost when a
case is shuttled between the Board and arbitrators rather than being
processed expeditiously by the Board. -9 5
In its reply to IBEW, the Board posited answers analogous to those
presented in its CWA brief, but was more sophisticated and introspective
in its approach to the subject matter. The first portion of its response
was a recapitulation of the facts of the case - " which, as already indicated,
involved a question of whether or not a unilateral change in working
conditions actually occurred. These facts were not in dispute but there
was little agreement as to the appropriate legal resolution of the conflict.
The Board addressed itself to this with an introduction to the Collyer
policy.297 The Board has concluded that it should defer whenever a
dispute is well suited for arbitration, the company has asserted a willingness to arbitrate, and there exists a history of amicable collectivebargaining relations 2 98 It further averred that there has been a careful
screening of cases to insure that the rights of the parties are safe337 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965).
288. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
289. See Brief for Petitioner at 38, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB.
290. Id. at 33, 44.
291. Id. at 34 & n.16.
287.

292.

Id. at 42.

293.

Id. at 43 (citing United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 85, 99 (2d Cir. 1971)).

294.
295.
296.

Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 45-46.
Brief for NLRB at 1-3, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB.
Id. at 13-16.

297.

298. Id. at 14-19.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

guarded.2 99 Thus, its handling of potential unfair labor practice petitions
has been discerning and discriminating as have its decisions under
Spielberg. °
Respondent then set out to rebut petitioner's contention that a policy
of deferral is beyond the scope of Board discretion, pointing out that
although section 10(a) of the Act gives the Board authority to resolve
unfair labor practice disputes, it does not compel the Board to act.
"[I]t is settled law that the extent to which the Board chooses to exercise (its]
jurisdiction . . . is a matter of administrative policy within the Board's discretion."
..[T]he Board has discretion to "decline to exercise its authority over alleged unfair

labor practices if to do so will serve the fundamental aims of the Act." 830

The Board also set forth the language of section 203 (d) and noted
that it, as well as section 301, was passed in 1947, twelve years after
the Wagner Act, by which time there had emerged congressional preference for resolution of industrial strife by the arbitral process. 02 Furthermore, wten these amendments were passed, Congress considered
making the violation of an arbitration agreement an unfair labor practice. °3 Although this provision was deleted from the final version of
the bill, the commentary in the Senate Report30 4 is indicative of the
results which Congress hoped to achieve by the Taft-Hartley Amendments:
It is the purpose of this bill to encourage free-collective bargaining; it would not be
conducive to that objective if the Board became the forum for trying day-to-day
grievances or if in the guise of unfair labor practice cases it entertained damage
actions arising out of breach of contract.80 5

The Board went on to point out the actions of the courts in the years
since Taft-Hartey was enacted. They have, for example, given strong
affirmation to the Spielberg doctrine, 80 a fait accompli which the petitioner not only failed to challenge, but in fact accepted. 07 Moreover,
299. Id. at 16 n.15 (citing, e.g., Pauley Paving Co., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (Dec. 12,
1972); Local 17, Sheet Metal Workers, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (Sept. 20, 1972); Kansas
Meat Packers, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (July 31, 1972); Tulsa-Whisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc.,
195 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (Jan. 26, 1972)).
300. See, e.g., Brief for NLRB at 32 n.32, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB (citing Local 425,
Office Employees v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). "There Is nothing before us
to indicate abuses [in the Spielberg policy] at this regional level." Office Employees, supra,
at 319.
301. Brief for NLRB at 17, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB (citations omitted).

302. Id. at 18. See also text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
303. Brief for NLRB at 18-19, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB.
304.

S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).

305. Id. at 23.
306. Brief for NLRB at 23, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB.
307. Brief for Petitiofaer at 37, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB.
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the Board cited NLRB v. Strong,308 and Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney,30 9 as support for the proposition that the Board is not authorized to replace the courts in the field of contract interpretation. 310 It
referred to NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp.", as merely standing for
the proposition that, in the absence of any arbitration provision, the
Court would be inclined to approve of Board intervention. This is not
to be taken as an anti-deferral policy and the Court in C & C Plywood
referred to Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 12 as support for its
language:
[I]t is important first to point out that the collective bargaining agreement contained no arbitration clause. The contract did provide grievance procedures, but the
end result of those procedures, if differences between the parties remained unresolved,
was economic warfare, not "the therapy of arbitration."318

Other important decisions-Steelworkers Trilogy, Smith v. Evening News
Association, and Boys Markets-were interjected, 14 with one of the
Trilogy quoted at length 3 1 5 The thrust of respondent's argument appeared
to be that in light of the Court's proclivity to support the use of the
arbitral forum, there is no sound reason for refusing to extend the
Spielberg doctrine to Collyer. Furthermore, although it is true that,
pursuant to section 10(a) of the LMRA, the Board cannot be precluded
from exercising its authority when an unfair labor practice may be
involved, it is equally correct that the Board is free to exercise its
discretion and refrain from acting when to do so will serve the fundamental aims of the Act 3 l
The Board then added a new twist to its Collyer argument with an
exhaustion of remedies theory.8 17 To this end, the Board proffered: 18
(1) the Norris-La Guardia Act which provides for the denial of an
injunction to a party who has failed to negotiate or arbitrate; (2) Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,31 9 requiring union members to exhaust
internal grievance procedures; and (3) the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 encouraging courts to refrain"-' from
308. 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
309. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).

310. Brief for NLRB at 20, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB.
311. 385 US. 421 (1967).
312.

375 U.S. 261 (1964).

313. 385 U.S. at 426 (footnote omitted).
314. Brief for NLRB at 21-24, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id. at 22.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 25-26.

319. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
320. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1970).
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intervention (though not binding them to do so) while attempts are made
to resolve differences between an employee and his union on an internal
basis. This is an interesting and persuasive argument assuming the
existence of a remedy, but is inappropriate where the time limit for
invoking such a remedy has expired. The majority of the Board in
Collyer artfully avoided the time issue. Respondent also endeavored to
defeat the chimerical horrors which petitioner had conjured up of incompetent arbitrators being accorded more responsibility than they can
handle, thus allowing unfair labor practices to go uncorrected. The
arbitrator is generally chosen because of his expertise in dealing with
the daily wrangles arising at the grassroots level. He is familiar with the
argot of the shop, the practices in the area, and the personnel involved.
He can assess the situation with pragmatic insight rather than applying esoteric niceties of law in ignorance of the facts.

21

The NLRB dis-

missed as unrealistic any mercurial increases in the meting out of justice
by resort to the Board since arbitration is, if anything, less time-consuming. 22 Lastly, there is no reason to envision either a decrease in arbitration3 2 or, in light of the
success of Spielberg, a dilution of the remedies
82 4
afforded the aggrieved.

On June 20, 1973, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit issued the first appellate court decision on the Collyer doctrine
in Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB. 325 While many of the issues involved were
similar to those already fully discussed, this case was somewhat unique
in that it was management which protested the broad sweep of Collyer,
while the union was the party allegedly in violation of the contract.
Moreover, section 8(b) was in issue rather than section 8(a). Specifically, the union was charged with violations of section 8 (b) (3) for refusing to make cash collections for the company and sections 8(b) (1) (a)
26
and 8(b) (2) for coercing workers who continued to do so.8
The petitioner, in its brief, did not take issue with Spielberg or the
development of a deferral policy under that doctrine.8 27 In fact, it did
not really criticize the Board for endorsing Collyer, but actually acquiesced in the propriety of deferral under ordinary circumstances,8 28 an
attitude frequently expressed by management. However, the petitioner
321.

Brief for NLRB at 22, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB.

322.

Id. at 31 n.31.

323.
324.
325.
326.

Id.
Id. at 32.
479 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 772.

327.

Brief for Petitioner at 17-20, Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB.

328.

Id. at 20-22.
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challenged the application of the doctrine in this particular instance as
reaching well beyond the scope of Collyer.
The first point argued was that the time had passed for invoking
available grievance procedures. 3 29 Apparently management was less concerned with this procedural nicety than it was with the Board's disregard for the results it would trigger by deferral in this case.
Thus, the Board has asked the Company to file a grievance three years after the
events giving rise to the dispute . . . and where, if the grievance deadlocks, the

Union is330
not committed to arbitration but the Company is virtually assured of facing
a strike.

As the petitioner had explained earlier in its brief,m 1 the grievance
committee was composed of an equal number of union and company
members. In order to go to arbitration it required a majority vote which
meant a capitulation by either a union or company member, an unlikely
result. Absent this rare concurrence of a majority, "either party [was]
permitted all legal or economic recourse including strike or lockout
'
action. ' tm
The contract was so designed because the Teamsters can
bring greater leverage to bear by confronting an employer with loss of
his trucking service than it can by always proceeding to arbitration.
Given the Board's decision in this instance, the company felt faced with
the choice of either surrendering to the union demands or facing a strike.
As the company pointed out, the Board refused to defer in TulsaWhisenhunt Funeral Homes, Ic.," where arbitration could have been
thwarted by a refusal on the part of the general manager to proceed
further, which would have resulted in economic warfare. It is difficult to
perceive any significant difference in Nabisco: either party could prevent
the implementation of arbitral proceedings; their bargaining history
showed this to be a common practice.
A reading of the Board's brief makes it clear that the Board intended
to push its theory of exhaustion of remedies to the limit. In other words,
even though either party can thwart arbitration, as long as the possibility
for internal resolution of the problem exists, the burden will be on the
party seeking to invoke the aid of the Board to show that it has gone as
far as it can go and has been rebuffed. Then the Board will consider the
complaint. This is a marked deviation from the requirement, enunciated
earlier in the development of Collyer, that mandatory arbitration be
available.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 23.
195 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (Jan. 26, 1972).

330
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Considering the far-reaching implications of Collyer, the brevity of
the Second Circuit's opinion in Nabisco was somewhat surprising-it
took the court less than two pages to reach its conclusion. Following
the lead of the petitioner's brief, the court never questioned the propriety
of Collyer per se. Moreover, Judges Friendly, Hays and Jameson
ignored, as had the Collyer majority, petitioner's reminder that the time
limits for arbitration had expired. Thus, the court failed to confront a
crucial issue-the extent to which the Board can compel a party to
arbitrate, after the contractual time limits for doing so have run, without
violating the prohibition against the rewriting of contracts.
What the Nabisco court did focus on was the question of deferral
absent mandatory arbitration:114 Should the scope of Collyer be so
confined?
We do not read the policy underlying the Act, as expressed in the legislative history, so
narrowly. As the Senate Report stated . . . "the intention of the committee in this
regard is that cases of contract violation be entertained on a highly selective basis,
when it is demonstrated to the Board that 38alternative
methods of settling the dispute
5
have been exhausted or are not available."

For case law to support the proposition that the Board has a wide
latitude in its discretion to defer, the court relied on Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.8 56 and Smith v. Evening News Association.8 7 The
result was a wholehearted endorsement of a broad and expanding policy
of deferral where there exists the slightest possibility that arbitration
may occur. The court seemed reluctant, however, to acknowledge that
this case represented any marked departure from previous Board decisions. Thus, the case of Tulsa-Whisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc. was
relegated to a footnote as clearly distinguishable.3 8 To be sure, the cases
may be distinguished on the facts. However, when both cases are viewed
in light of the ultimate objective which the Board presumably hopes to
achieve, namely arbitration, the court's logic appears to condone a distinction without a difference. In Tulsa-Whisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc., the
arbitral process was available on an ad hoc basis after completion of the
final step of the grievance procedure. Thus, although arbitration was not
334.
335.

479 F.2d at 773.
Id. at 773 (quoting S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947); 1 Legislative

History of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, at 429). It is interesting to note
that this identical statutory argument was posited by the Board in its IBEW brief. See
text accompanying notes 304-0 supra.
336. 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964), in turn quoting approvingly from International Harvester
Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26 (1962).
337. 371 U.S. 195, 198 n.6 (1962).

These are the same cases relied on by the majority
in Collyer itself. In fact the court quoted the same portions used by the Board.
338. 479 F.2d at 773 n.3.

1973)

NLRB DEFERRAL POLICY

specifically outlined within the framework of the contract, the parties
could, if both agreed, proceed to arbitration after exhausting the grievance
procedure. The Board, in refusing to defer in Tulsa-Whisenhunt Funeral
Homes, Inc., made no effort to discern how often the parties had in
fact entered into such an arbitration arrangement.
In Nabisco, arbitration was specifically provided for in the collectivebargaining agreement. Nevertheless, it could be and usually was defeated.
Neither the Board in granting nor the Court in approving deferral gave
any weight to the unlikelihood that the arbitral process would be utilized.
It makes little sense for the Board to defer where although the machinery
of arbitration has been technically outlined in the contract, resort to
arbitration is highly unlikely. Conversely, it would be sensible to refuse
to defer where arbitration has not been technically provided for in the
contract but the! bargaining history of the parties indicates that resort
to arbitration is a usual result. Surely, the logically consistent approach
would be to defer in an appropriate Tudsa-type case as well.
While Collyer was being debated on the east coast it was not being
entirely neglected on the west coast. In the Ninth Circuit case of Local
274, Provision House Workers v. NLRB, 30 the union was disenchanted
with what it termed a unilateral change in the wage and fringe benefits
provisions.3 40 As in the other cases pending appellate review, the Board
found that the issues involved were up for determination through the
agreed-upon procedures of arbitration and declined to consider the matter
under its Collyer doctrine.34
The Board's brief concluded that deferral was proper and within the
scope of its authority34 2 for the same reasons advanced in its IBEW
brief.Y43 It rejected the premise that Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing
Co!" was a mandate against deferral,3 43 as it had done in its brief in
0 46 It went on to pronounce the favoritism which Congress
the CWA case.
was to display for the Taft-Hartley Amendments, 347 liberally relying on
339.

No. 72-2617 (9th Cir., filed Oct. 24, 1972), appealing Urban N. Patman, Inc,

197

NT.L.R.B. No. 150 (June 30, 1972).
340. Brief for NLRB at 2 et seq., Local 274, Provision House Workers v. NLRB (discussion of Board's finding of facts).
341. 197 N.L.X.B. No. 150, at 4.
342. Brief for NLRB at 13, Local 274, Provision House Workers v. NLRB.
343. Brief for NLRB at 17, Local 2188, IBEW v. NTLRB.
344. 444 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1971).
345. Brief for NLRB at 14 n.3, Local 274, Provision House Workers v. NLRB. In Templeton, the Board was reprimanded for abuse of discretion in arbitrarily applying its "blocking
charge" policy. 444 F.2d at 1070.
346. Brief for NLRB at 24 n.12, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB.
347. Brief for NLRB at 14-16, Local 274, Provision House Workers v. NLRB.
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passages quoted in the IBEW brief.848 Of the more than sixty cases
cited by the Board in its Provision House brief only perhaps five had
not been cited previously, and were mere affirmations of previously
advanced case law.
Another case pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit is Associated Press v. NLRB. 4 9 While this
case does involve the application of Collyer, the petitioner's briefso is
geared more toward challenging the Board's decision in the particular
case than undermining the viability of Collyer itself. Succinctly stated,
the facts involve a question as to when the cancellation of a check-off is
proper. The question is whether employees have withdrawn their checkoff if they resign during the hiatus between the old and new contract,
absent a written withdrawal.
Petitioner, the employer, recognized a withdrawal of check-off provisions for some 102 employees during a hiatus between the termination
of an old contract and the formation of a new one with the Wire Service
Guild, Local 222.851 Upon request by the union for arbitration, the petitioner sought to enjoin such a proceeding but was ordered to arbitrate
by the district court. 52 The parties proceeded to arbitration without
any challenge to the district court's order to arbitrate." 8 The arbitrator
decided against the petitioner on the question of dues check-off. 54 Petitioner then sought relief from the Board, but was advised that insofar
as the arbitrator had addressed issues presented, the Spielberg doctrine
applied, and insofar as any matters sought for review which had not
been passed upon by the arbitrator were concerned, the Collyer doctrine
controlled. 5'
It would appear, therefore, because of the facts of the case and the
manner in which the issues were postulated, that, like the CWA case,
it will not present a clear-cut Collyer question. The part that was deferred
under Spielberg clearly falls within the ambit of a long standing and
348.
349.

Brief for NLRB at 19, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB.
No. 73-1002 (D.C. Cir., filed Jan. 2, 1973), on appeal from 199 N.L.R.B. No. 168

(1972).
350. Brief for Petitioner, Associated Press v. NLRB, No. 73-1002 (D.C. Cir., filed
Jan. 2, 1973).
351. Id. at 7.
352. Associated Press v. Wire Serv. Guild, 73 L.R.R.M. 2908 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
353. "APs argument that Judge Palmieri improvidently ordered arbitration of the
dispute between the parties is clearly addressed to the improper forum. AP did not appeal
Judge Palmieri's decision to the appropriate Federal court of appeals." 199 N.L.R.B. No. 168,
at 12 n.9.
354. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Associated Press v. NLRB.
355. 199 N.L.R.B. No. 168, at 11-12.
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well received deferral doctrine. If the Board is overturned on this point
it will signify only that, under Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,151 the
reviewing court did not find the evidence supporting the decision to be
substantial when viewed in the light of the record in its entirety. A
similar result would follow if the deferral based on Collyer were found
to be unsound. This is especially so since the petitioner did not attack
the viability of either Spielberg or Collyer in its appeal. The propriety of
the doctrine is not before the court; any comment the court might address
to that area would only be dicta. Also, it seems likely that other cases
in which the Collyer issue is more clearly presented will be decided
before Associated Press.
In the case of Enterprise Publishing Co. v. NLRB,O3 management
alleged that the union had violated sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (2)
of the Act." 8 The union had sought the dismissal of three employees for
alleged violations of the maintenance of membership clause, despite the
fact that the employees had tendered their resignations to the union
during the hiatus between the expiration of an old contract on April 23,
1970 and the signing of a new one on October 23, 1970." While the
expanding focus of Collyer might have to be altered if petitioner prevails,
this is another case in which the viability of the Collyer doctrine itself
is concededO Again, this is characteristically a management stance.
In Enterprise the alleged aberrations were threefold. First, the employees' own bargaining agent, the union, was seeking to have them
discharged. Hence, resort to arbitration could not be "fair and regular"
because they were not properly represented. 301 Second, statutory interpretation was involved and this was said to be beyond the competence of
the arbitrator.36 2 Last, arbitration was inappropriate since the Board has
already heard the entire case on the merits.Y0
The last contention was denied by the Board in one brief paragraph
of semantics."6 The Board asserted, despite two full days of hearings,
356. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
357. No. 73-1154 (1st Cir., filed May 15, 1973), on appeal from 201 N.L.R.B. No. 118
(Feb. 12, 1973).
358. Brief for NLRB at 1, Enterprise Publishing Co. v. NLRB, No. 73-1154 (Ist Cir.,
filed May 15, 1973).
359. Id. at 2-5 (discussion of Board's finding of facts).
360. Brief for Petitioner at 19, Enterprise Publishing Co. v. NLRB: "For this reason
alone, this is not an appropriate case for the application of Collyer and it would do no
violence to the Collyer doctrine to require the Board to decide this case on the merits."
361. Id. at 7.
362. Id. at 8.
363. Id.
364. Brief for NTLRB at 10-11, Enterprise Publishing Co. v. NLRB.
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that since it failed to render a decision, it didn't really hear the case on
the merits. While this explanation is unsatisfactory, perhaps there was
little else the Board could say. When this case arose in August 1971,
Collyer was a novel concept. 3 In the early stages of Collyer's development, exhaustive hearings before the Board were the order of the day.
Since the evolution of Collyer, expedited procedures are being implemented by the Board with an eye towards eliminating Board review
entirely in Collyer-type situations by encouraging the application of the
Collyer doctrine at the regional level. 3 6 Therefore, acceptance of the
Collyer policy by petitioner presumes an acceptance of the more exhaustive review procedures that were necessary for the implementation of
this policy. Since petitioner did not challenge Collyer itself, reversal on
this ground is unlikely.
The assertion that statutory issues, unencumbered by contractual considerations, are clearly at stake and that resort to arbitration is inappropriate for their resolution presents a thornier issue and one which
highlights the ever broadening scope of Collyer. In the 8(a) (5) context
in which Collyer originated, the mixture of unfair labor practice and
contract issues was such that one could hardly be resolved without the
other. However, in the 8(b) (2) and 8(a) (3) areas, there often exists a
much sharper dichotomy. One can more nearly isolate a statutory issue
from attendant contract considerations. This is true in Enterprise.
The collective bargaining agreement had a maintenance of membership
clause which provided, in essence, that an employee who was or became
a member was obliged to maintain that membership during the life of
the contract. 6 7 It also had a clause which provided for negotiation of a
new agreement with the proviso that the old contract remain in full force
and effect during such negotiations. 8" The union thus took the position
that an employee could not successfully tender his resignation from
membership during negotiations because the contract was still binding,
there being no escape clause. The union urged that the recalcitrant
employees, therefore, should be fired by the company for failing to maintain union membership. Petitioner filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the Board asserting that such a lock-in of employees by contract
language which fixed no termination date, since it could be renewed
indefinitely, was per se unlawful. 869 The Board's rationalization for deferral was that this was merely another case involving a contract deter365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 386-90 infra.
Brief for Petitioner at 3, Enterprise Publishing Co. v. NLRB.
Id.
Id. at 16-17.
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mination since the effect that the negotiation clause (keeping the contract
in full force and effect during negotiations) would have on the maintenance of membership clause (requiring good standing for the life of
the agreement) was fundamentally a contract issue. 70 Once more the
Board engaged in semantics. By twisting words about, invariably one can
find some semblance of a contract issue to which to resort. But here
the petitioner was willing to concede the contract issue altogether. Assuming an arbitrator did find that by virtue of the negotiations clause the
employees were locked into a continuous contract with no hiatus in which
to resign, was that an unfair labor practice? It would be difficult to
posit a more clearly isolated question of statutory interpretation. If the
Board would abdicate to an arbitrator under these circumstances, it is
difficult to envision when it would ever do anything but defer, no matter
how specious the contract issue. The court may choose to avoid a detailed
analysis of the 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) type question, a very controversial
area of the Collyer doctrine, by either outright rejection or acceptance
of Collyer under such circumstances. It would be a more difficult task
for the court to attempt to lay down guidelines which are less elusive
than the Collyer standards have been to date.
Further analysis of the Board's approach to this point is warranted.
In fairness to the Board, it may have based deferral on the presumption
that it is well settled law that a dues lock-in is an unfair labor practice.3 7' If this were so, then the arbitrator's contract interpretation
could be viewed as dispositive.17 2 But the Board implied that this is by
no means the settled law. The authors are unaware of any appellate court
which has passed upon this question and are certain that the Supreme
Court has not. It is doubtful that such a lock-in clause would be upheld
in a right-to-work state in light of the Supreme Court's union 73 and
agency' 4 shop decisions allowing states to ban agreements requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. Courts
in general have often found contract arrangements of excessive or inde370. Brief for NLRB at 11, Enterprise Publishing Co. v. NLRD.
371. Id. at 11-12 (citing International Union, UAW, 142 N.L.R.B. 296, 301 (1963)).
372. "Of course, should the extender clause be held to apply to the maintenance of
membership clause, there would be no hiatus between contracts and, under established law,
the employees would not be free to resign.. . . On the other hand, if the maintenance of
membership clause should be held not to have been extended, a question would arise as to
whether the employees had properly resigned.. . .Resolution of this issue presents questions
of both fact and contract interpretation." Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted).
373. AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949); Lincoln Fed. Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
374. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 US. 746 (1963).
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terminate length to be unduly oppressive.87 5 Even if it were settled law,
the implications of the Board's refusal to rule on a statutory question
are startling. It is doubtful that the parties to this agreement, by electing
to incorporate an arbitration clause in the contract, intended to waive
their right to Board review. Furthermore, the so-called settled law relied
on by the Board for deferral is documented by the lone citation 7 0 of a
Board case over six years old.11 7 The Board apparently intends to defer
anytime it has ever ruled on a question before. If such foisting of all
statutory questions onto the shoulders of an arbitrator does not effectively
preclude review, it certainly significantly impedes it. Arbitrators have
been upheld even when they have decided wrongly on the law." How
then can one petition the court to overturn an arbitrator's award when
he is right on the law, the only law in the matter being a previous Board
decision. Moreover, it would be difficult to argue to the Board that
Spielberg should not be controlling because the arbitrator has applied
Board law with which petitioner is unhappy. If Collyer is to be left
substantially intact, perhaps some method should be made available for
certifying for court review those legal questions which could be controlling. Otherwise, a petitioner not only must suffer the protracted
delay of arbitration but also must overcome the unfair onus of the legal
presumption which favors upholding the decision of an arbitrator.
Petitioner's remaining question also raises interesting implications.
How will the real parties in interest-the employees who stand to be
dismissed-be protected when the union is hostile to their cause? Undoubtedly the Board feels that it is not essential that the employees'
interests be represented by the union since, by retaining jurisdiction,
the Board can later determine if the employees were adequately protected. While this seems plausible, we do not know how the Board would
respond to a number of other questions which, although alluded to by
petitioner, were not fully elucidated. Collyer presupposes the existence
of arbitration machinery of which the parties can avail themselves. Yet,
in this instance, the employees have no such machinery available. They
cannot initiate arbitration and their usual agent at such proceedings is
hostile. Thus, they would not be bound by the result. That being the
case, they would effectively get a second chance. If the union wins at
arbitration and forces the company to fire its members, the employees
could then resort to filing an unfair labor practice charge. This is the
meaningless duplication of effort and multiplicity of suits which Collyer
375. Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 77 (1956).
376. Brief for NLRB at 13-14, Enterprise Publishing Co. v. NLRB.

377. Teamsters Local 959, 167 N.L.R.B. 1042 (1967).
378. F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 27 (2d ed. 1960).
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decried. On the other hand, if the Board attempts to impose the arbitrator's decision on the employees as binding, this would amount to a far
more blatant instance of contract writing than the imposed waiver of
time limits lamented by IBEW in its brief. The Board actually would
have to create binding arbitration by its own ad hoc legislative fiat.
Petitioner's assertion presented the Board with two problems. First,
it raised the possibility that an unfair labor practice charge could later
be filed successfully by the employees if an adverse award were rendered,
and secondly, in the absence of agreement by the employees not to be
bound, it would in effect result in a rewriting of the contract by the
Board. This latter proposition was not clearly articulated by the Board
but it lurks prominently in the background. The Board did address the
first problem and quoted Humphrey v. Moore,371 in which the Court
stated: "[W] e are not ready to find a breach of the collective bargaining
agent's duty of fair representation in taking a good faith position contrary
to that of some individuals whom it represents ... ."I" While this language is impressive, Humphrey was not an unfair labor practice case
but a section 301 suit for breach of contract, and, earlier in its discussion,
the Court, referring to this very same topic, stated: "[W]hether [or not]
a violation of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice
...it is not necessary for us to resolve that difference here."U'
A case the brief writer for the Board failed to utilize was International
Harvester.3 8 2 In that case not only was the union hostile to the employees'
interests but the employees were not even notified of the hearing, were
not present, and were represented solely by management. Nonetheless, the
Board affirmed the dismissal and that decision, which was challenged by
the employees in an unfair labor practice suit, was upheld by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Thus, there is appellate
court precedent which could preclude an unfair labor practice suit following an adverse arbitration award. The question of the duty of fair representation was not raised here. The area, therefore, is filled with far
less certainty than the Board might have us believe. As to the question
of contract rewriting which the Board does not address, the court in
InternationalHarvester clearly countenanced the binding of employees
to an arbitration of which they were never advised. Of course, this result
379. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
380. Id. at 349.
381. Id. at 344.
382. 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), enforced sub noma.Ramsey v. NTLRB, 327 Fad 784
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964). The Board dted this case in its brief as
supporting deferral, but without commenting on the facts. Brief for NLRB at 7, Enterprise
Publishing Co. v. NLRB.
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Porter,383

preceded the decision in H.K.
so one can only speculate as to
whether the outcome would be the same today. However, the shape of
Collyer will not be complete until these questions have been answered.
Finally, The Brockton Newspaper Guild, intervenor, raised for the
first time, albeit in a footnote, the question which until now had lain
dormant: is a Collyer order a final order within the meaning of the Act
such that appellate review can properly be sought?38 4 Intervenor appears
to have concluded perceptively that it may not be a final order. 8" However, since intervenor is desirous of seeing Collyer prevail, these remarks
were cautiously restricted to a footnote appraisal and it was urged that
this issue not be held to be determinative. Since a court can always raise
an issue of jurisdiction, even sua sponte, and since this matter has now
been brought to the court's attention, this case may provide the first
indication as to how the jurisdictional quandary posed by Collyer will
be handled.
In Letter Carriers,Local 2184 v. NLRB, 880 the union challenged the
ultimate concept in Collyerization. There can be little doubt that Board
philosophy, as embodied in Collyer, has been motivated greatly by the
desire to reduce the Board's caseload to a manageable level. 87 It was
therefore logical and inevitable that the successful effectuation of this
policy would call for the application of Collyer at the grassroots level, a
development which would eventually relieve the Board almost entirely
of its task. Precisely such an implementation of Collyer gave rise to the
instant case. The union, which filed two separate 8(a) (5) charges, was
advised by a regional director for the NLRB that since arbitration was
available, he would defer on the basis of Collyer. After several months,
having failed to resort to arbitration, the union again sought to invoke
the assistance of the regional director. Another refusal by the regional
director to issue an unfair labor practice charge was upheld by the
Board's General Counsel. Petitioner sought to set aside that result.881
The case is the first to challenge the application of Collyer below the

Board level, but as a result of the tack petitioner chose to take, a hearing
on the merits will probably be delayed. It has long been held that the
decision of the General Counsel not to issue an unfair labor practice
383. H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
384. Brief for Brockton Newspaper Guild as Intervenor at 6-7 n.1, Enterprise Publishing
Co. v. NLRB.
385. Id. Intervenor also has noted that if it is considered a final order the Board may
not have authority to administer arbitration since the filing of a petition pursuant to § 10(F)
of the Act divests the Board of jurisdiction. Id.
386. No. 73-1921 (D.C. Cir., filed Sept. 13, 1973).
387. See text accompanying note 211 supra.
388. On appeal, the separate unfair labor practice charges were consolidated into one case.
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complaint is not a final order subject to review. Appellate courts, therefore, are without jurisdiction to entertain such a suit.s For this reason,
petitioner seems likely to be the victim of a motion to dismiss. This, however, is not an adjudication on the merits. Petitioner could still attempt
to challenge the Board at the district court level. In the case of Leedorn
v. Kyne,3 ° the Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to the general rule precluding review by allowing a party to invoke the equitable
jurisdiction of the district court. Such review is limited to those exceptional circumstances in which the Board can be said to have acted clearly
beyond the scope of its authority. This presents a difficult burden of
proof for the moving party, but it would at least afford the union the
opportunity to present a clear-cut challenge to the legality of the Board's
deferral policy under Collyer. Furthermore, regardless of the outcome,
the case is important in that it indicates the direction in which the Board
is heading.
Not all of the factors motivating the parties to litigate necessarily have
risen to the surface. Some, although alluded to, have remained submerged beneath a flood of legalese. An examination of these factors
should further an understanding of what the parties really believe to be
at stake.
VI.

UND 1LYwNG RATIONALE

Since the announcement of the NLRB's decision in the Collyer case,
there has been a plethora of statements made by labor-management advocates and commentators regarding the parameters of the new doctrine:
arguments urging its rescission or extension, and speculation about its
future status in the judicial channels."9' While there is no consensus as
to the underlying motivation for the Board's policy of deferral to arbitra389. Anthony v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1953); Manhattan Constr. Co. v.
NLRB, 198 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1952); Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306 (Ist Cir. 1948).
390. 358 U.S. 184 (1958). A suit in this type of situation is grounded on 28 U-S.C. § 1337
(1970) which provides that: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce ....
"
There are no time limits for filing under § 1337 so the petitioner, Letter Carriers, Local 2184,
is not in danger of forfeiting his claim by having elected in the first instance to file in what
appears to be an improper forum. See The Developing Labor Law 189 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
391. See, e.g., Anderson, NLRB and Private Arbitration: Should Collyer Be Extended
to Employee Discipline Cases?, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1460 (1972); Anderson, Concurrent Jurisdiction-NLRB and Private Arbitration: A Pragmatic Analysis, 12 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 179 (1970); Samoff, Arbitration, Not NLRB Intervention, 18 Lab. L.J. 602
(1967); Note, Some Post-Deferral Considerations Pormpted by the NLRB's New Collyer
Doctrine, 13 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 824 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Post-Deferral Considerations]; Comment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 Yale L.J. 1191 (1968); 41
Fordham L. Rev. 175 (1972); 6 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 720 (1972); 18 Wayne L. Rev. 1191
(1972).
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tion enunciated in Collyer, there are significant considerations which
apparently have set the combatants on a collision course in the judicial
forum. An analysis of Collyer would be incomplete without an overview
of these underlying motivations.
A.

Arguments for Deferral

The Supreme Court decision in Boys Markets0 2 signalled a judicial
preference for deferral to arbitration in section 301 cases. In that case,
the Court indicated that arbitration had become "'the central institution
in the administration of collective bargaining contracts.' ,,9"3 Now, under
specified conditions, federal as well as state courts are allowed to enjoin
a strike in breach of a no-strike clause, notwithstanding the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act.
Since the vast majority of companies have chosen to provide for
collective-bargaining agreements with provisions for arbitration, it is
obvious that the arbitral arena has been chosen by the parties as the
most appropriate forum for resolution of contract disputes. 0 4 This
predilection, reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Boys Markets, is consistent with Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,""1 which stated
that a no-strike clause is a quid pro quo for arbitration.
One of the more persuasive arguments supporting the Board's deferral
policy in Collyer is the consequent reduction in the Board's caseload.
While it has been suggested, perhaps tongue in cheek, that the Board's
caseload at any given time has been the factor that determined whether
the Board would assert its own jurisdiction or defer to arbitration,""0
clearly this is a serious concern.897 There is evidence to demonstrate that
the Board's caseload has doubled over the past ten years, with unfair labor
practices accounting for more than fifty-eight percent 8" of the total.
Indeed, a deferral policy may obviate the duplication of effort inherent
in affording parties more than one available forum for settling their
392. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
393. Id. at 252 (quoting Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political
Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 Yale L.J. 1547, 1557 (1963)).
394. Ninety-four percent of all labor-management agreements have provisions for arbitration, Samoff, supra note 391, at 604; Comment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration,
77 Yale L.J. 1191 (1968).
395. 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957); The Developing Labor Law, supra note 390, at 445.
There, the Supreme Court expressed favor for the arbitral process and held that collectivebargaining agreements to arbitrate are binding and enforceable in the federal courts.
396. Samoff, supra note 391, at 606.
397. See text accompanying note 211 supra.
398. Anderson, Concurrent Jurisdiction-NLRB and Private Arbitration: A Pragmatic
Analysis, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 179, 189 (1970).
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disputes. The arbitrator in interpreting the contract may thereby resolve
an unfair labor practice involving an alleged violation of conduct that is
inextricably interwoven with the contract issue he is adjudicating. "
Moreover, in adopting the deferral policy enunciated in Collyer, the Board
has not committed an illegal or unwarranted abdication of its authority.
Neither has there been a diminution or trammeling of the employee's
rights safeguarded by the NLRA, since the Board, in an approach similar
to Spielberg,00 announced in Collyer its intention to continue policing
arbitration awards by retaining jurisdiction 0 1 pending determination of
the issue by the arbitrator.
Another policy consideration espoused for implementation of the
Collyer deferral policy is the positive effect upon labor-management relations presumed to flow from internal settlement of disputes and the
concomitant elimination of the disruptive impact upon the collectivebargaining process which results from Board intervention. 0 2 As a corollary, the Board may wish to encourage private settlement of labor
disputes to diminish the potential for undermining the arbitral forum
which is prevalent when an issue can be relitigated by the losing party
in an arbitration proceeding. In certain circumstances, a party may be
less inclined to arbitrate a dispute when the machinery of the Board
is available. 40 3 Moreover, the placement of the expense of settlement
upon the parties causing the dispute rather than on the taxpayer is
appealing.
Another justification for deference to arbitration is the arbitrator's
purported expertise in deciding contract issues.40 4 This contention is
399. See Hawkins v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1966), aff'g Mitchell Transport,
Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 122 (1965) (denial of petition to set aside); Raytheon Co. v. NTLRB,
326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964), rev'g 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963); Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142
N.L.R.B. 431 (1963); Precision Fittings, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1963).
400. Spielberg Mifg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
401. The Board "shall retain jurisdiction ... for the purpose of entertaining an appropriate and timely motion for further consideration upon a proper showing that either (a) the
dispute has not, with reasonable promptness after the issuance of this decision, either been
resolved by amicable settlement in the grievance procedure or submitted promptly to arbitration, or (b) the grievance or arbitration procedures have not been fair and regular or have
reached a result which is repugnant to the Act." 192 N.L.R.B. at 843 (footnote omitted).
402. Post-Deferral Considerations, supra note 391.
403. The readiness of a union or employer to accept arbitration rather than Board
proceedings often depends on the nature of the dispute. One author notes that "[a]lthougb
unions generally prefer no Board intervention in discharge cases, particularly those filed by
individuals, where arbitration is available or held, they shift when employers' subcontract,
alter working conditions, eliminate jobs or refuse to furnish information." Samoff, supra note
391, at 625. Employers are also inconsistent and will resist arbitration, fearing erosion of
managerial rights through adverse awards. Id.
404. Id.
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buttressed by the lack of public interest to be found in many contract
disputes. There is also a correlative lack of necessity for imposing
uniform standards where the contract may be resolved by interpretation
of language which is germane to the special interests of the parties
involved. Lastly, it should also be noted that the arbitrator is well suited
to examine, analyze and weigh the significance of the subtle factors
involved-especially political considerations-and can assess the intensity
of the grievance by discerning the demeanor and attitudes of the parties.
B.

Arguments Against Arbitration

The most trenchant arguments for overruling or severely limiting the
Collyer doctrine are articulated by the union spokesmen.
Union desire for unfettered access to the Board is motivated in part
by the knowledge that resolution of disputes charged as unfair labor
practices will cost more if deferred to arbitration. The relatively costfree process available with the Board's resolution of disputes contrasts
strongly with the expense of protracted arbitration. The potential unavailability of the Board as a forum may be construed as a subtle yet
effective form of economic coercion with unpalatable and unwarranted
consequences, which may include the denial of a statutory right of
access to the Board for adjudication of an asserted unfair labor practice.
One of the problems posed by Collyer is that the Board, in considering
unfair labor practice issues brought before it, is doing more than merely
"encouraging" resort by the parties to available arbitration machinery,
but rather is effectively "requiring" it. With respect to the costs of arbitration, the union advocates are confronted with the economic ramifications
that the application of Collyer may produce. ° An arbitration provision
may well be embraced by the union without the intent of resorting to
it in each and every instance since to do so might well cause the financial
ruin of a small union. Surely, no union which entered into a contract
prior to the advent of Collyer imagined that by virtue of such an arbitration clause it was effectively precluding itself in most instances from
invoking the immediate aid of the Board. Thus, although the public
may be sheltered from the ruinous results of open economic warfare
which the courts have sought to avoid, many small unions may still be
brought to their knees behind closed doors in a different but equally
deadly form of economic combat.
In discussing the possible effects attributable to the high cost of
arbitration, one respected scholar pointed out to the National Academy of
Arbitrators that "'[s]mall unions or financially weak firms may be
405.

See, e.g., 6 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 720, 732 (1972).
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"arbitrated to death" and thus legitimate interests of individual workers
or managers may be bargained away because of lack of funds to process
cases. That this is happening, frequently by design of the financially
stronger party, is evident from many sources in our profession.'"
Another fear concerns the scope of Collyer's application beyond the
area of 8(a) (5) violations. Soon after the Board's decision in Collyer, the
Board's General Counsel issued a memorandum40 7 which stated:
The Collyer policy of deferral for arbitration will be applied only to disputes involving
alleged refusals to bargain violative of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act and not to charges
alleging violations of other sections of the Act. 408

Since that memorandum, the Board has issued numerous decisions in
which it has applied and substantially extended its initial policy.40 9 Moreover, less than one year after the announcement of the initial guidelines,
the General Counsel issued revised guidelines4 10 which announced that
"[t]he Collyer policy has now been expanded by the Board to apply to
charges alleging violations of Sections 8(a) (1), (2) and (3) and 8(b) (1)
(A) and (B) and 8(b) (2) and (3), in addition to Section 8(a) (5).1'
The scope of review available in an arbitration proceeding raises an
additional consideration. It has been argued that an arbitrator may not
properly consider a labor dispute with the full panoply of safeguards
available in a Board proceeding, and, indeed, is ostensibly precluded
by section 10(a) from ruling on an unfair labor practice. 412 The purported
dilemma was succinctly stated by Arbitrator S. Calm: an arbitrator may
not interpret section 8-he "may only decide whether the Agreement as
written has been breached,
not whether the Agreement as written breaches
' 4 13
or violates any law.
406. Remarks of Professor Irvin Sobel, in Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, Arbitration
and Public Policy, 96, 98-99 (1961) (cited in Collyer, 192 N.LR.B. at 854-55 (Member
Jenkins, dissenting)).
407. General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 84.
408. Id. at 2. The justification for this statement was that: 'The complaint in the Collyer
case alleged the violation of Section 8(a) (5) and the principal opinion of the Board made no
reference, even by indirection, to the applicability of its deferral policy to 8(a) (3) violations.
Thus, the principal opinion failed either to endorse or reject Member Brown's express contention that the Board's arbitration deferral policy should be applied to Section 8(a) (3) and
8(a) (1) violations as well as 8(a) (5) violations." Id. at n.1.
409. See General Counsel's Memorandum, Arbitration Deferral Policy Under CollyrRevised Guidelines, Jan. 31, 1973, especially cases cited at 1 nn.1-3.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 2.
412. Post-Deferral Considerations, supra note 391, at 826; cf. Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), where the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the courts
under section 301(a) of the Act to compel arbitration or affirm an arbitral award even
though the activity complained of may also constitute an unfair practice.
413. Rowland Tompkins & Son, 35 Lab. Arb. 154, 156 (1960).
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In addition to the alleged statutory proscription, there arise questions
as to the competency of arbitrators to interpret the statutory language,
the time element involved in arbitrating an issue, and the limited discretion and remedies available to an arbitrator. For example, if an employee
is fired for his union activity, there may well be an action for discrimination under section 8(a) (3), but an arbitrator in a hearing need only
rule on the issue of just cause. Also, the procedural laxity in arbitration
hearings-which allows evidence such as hearsay, past performance
record, and fruits of an illegal search-dissipates the more stringent due
process safeguards afforded in a Board proceeding. Moreover, the arbitrator cannot issue a cease and desist order or post notice or provide other
types of remedies. Unlike the Board's processes, arbitration can be invoked only by the union and not by an individual. Thus, as pointed out
in Member Jenkins's dissent in Collyer, the arbitrator's decision cannot
remedy present statutory violations or control future conduct; "it cannot
effectively protect the public interest by providing adequate remedies
for violations, and it may sacrifice individual rights guaranteed by the
Act because it is not available to aggrieved individuals." 414
It has been suggested that a further attenuation of the Board's powers
by a "placid acceptance of arbitration as an alternative, rather than
subordinate, forum,"415 may involve an abdication of a major portion of
the Board's statutory responsibility resulting in a denial of an employee's
guaranteed statutory rights. For example, on the local levels, leaders fear
rigged arbitration.416 The vociferous employee may find himself jobless
when the collusive interests of the union and the company unite to deter
an airing of a legitimate 8(a) (3) complaint. A corollary fear voiced
by the union is characterized by Member Fanning's dissent in Collyer as
'
"compulsory arbitration."4 17
Although the majority opinion in Collyer
rejected this contention, the recent extension of the doctrine beyond
8(a) (5) violations 1 8 may justify union concern that arbitration should
be only an option in a contract, and not a waiver of statutory rights.
Another compelling consideration is the limited review available if the
arbitral process is employed. Furthermore, once the choice has been made
to insert an arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement,
there appears to be little likelihood that the process will not be employed.
414.

192 N.L.R.B. at 855.

415. Christensen, Labor Arbitration and Judicial Oversight, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 671, 683
(1967).
416.
417.
418.
Revised

Comment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 Yale L.J. 1191, 1207 (1968).
192 N.L.R.B. at 847.
General Counsel's Memorandum, Arbitration Deferral Policy Under CollyerGuidelines, Jan. 31, 1973, at 2.

1973]

NLRB DEFERRAL POLICY

A party that seeks to enforce a contract in court pursuant to a section 301
suit will be precluded from the judicial forum if the contract provides
for the settling of disputes by resorting to available arbitration machinery.
In fact, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Boys Markets,41
the union's most potent weapon-the strike--can be enjoined by the
court and arbitration compelled if the arbitral process is provided for
by contract.
At the same time, Collyer precludes the union from seeking immediate
redress from the Board when arbitration is deemed to be the appropriate
forum, thereby foreclosing the Board process as a primary arena for
settling disputes involving alleged violations of the Act. Once the arbitrator renders his decision, from a pragmatic and legal standpoint, review
is extremely limited.
To pursue judicial review of an arbitrator's decision, the moving party
must be prepared to overcome the limited review criteria set forth by
the Supreme Court in the Steelworker's Trilogy:
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all
questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining
whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed
by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract
interpretation for the arbitrator. In these circumstances the moving party should not
be deprived of the arbitrator's judgment, when it was his judgment and all that it
connotes that was bargained for.
The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the grievance,
considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether
there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim.
The agreement is to submit 42all
grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the
0
court will deem meritorious.

On the other hand, the Board's review of an arbitrator's award may
provide an equally formidable obstacle in light of the Board's propensity
to rely on Spielberg-let the decision stand unless the results are
repugnant to the Act. Based on the criteria set forth in Collyer'I concerning Board retention of jurisdiction and the Board's policy of deference
to the arbitrator's award consistently applied in Spielberg situations,
there is reason to believe that Board review under Collyer circumstances
likewise will be limited4 2 The net result, then, whether Board or judicial
419. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
420. Steelworkers Trilogy, 363 U.S. at 567-68 (footnote omitted).
421. 192 N.L.R.B. at 843.
422. Nash Address, supra note 65. The General Counsel sounded an ominous note with
the following passage: "Whether, once Collyer becomes settled law, the Board will continue
to hold cases for a retrospective review is yet an open question, particularly in light of the
Board's heavy reliance on Consolidated Aircraft Corp., which involved an outright dismissal of an 8(a)(5) complaint." Id. at 157 (footnote omitted).
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review of an arbitrator's decision is sought, may be an illusory choice
for the complainant concerned with the scope of review available beyond
the arbitral forum.
Finally, there is some dissatisfaction with the arbitral forum. Many
parties have serious doubts about the caliber of arbitrators and the
quality of their awards. There is concern about the possibility of an
unwarranted rewriting of the contract by an arbitrator, the potential for
collusive practices and indifference to the public interest, 420 and the
alleged self-serving proclivity of an arbitrator to attempt to assuage both
sides in order to secure future employment. Lastly, it should be noted
that while an arbitrator's award is persuasive in influencing a colleague's
decision, such an accommodation is analogous to the doctrine of comity
and does not have the binding effect of stare decisis resulting from a
judicial decision.
This is the history of Collyer to date but since what is past is prologue
let us now turn our thoughts toward the future of Collyer.
VII. Collyer-Desideratum OR Maranatha
In 1898 a Milwaukee paper reported Clarence Darrow's statements
in the woodworkers' conspiracy case in the following headline and story:
Chicago attorney says present case is an incident of great social problem agitating
424
the world.
A strike in the sash, door and blind industry in Oshkosh, Wisconsin was the spark
that led to the filing of charges against Thomas I. Kidd, general secretary, Amalgamated Woodworkers' International Union, and George Zentner and Michael Troiber,
both of Oshkosh, who acted as picket captains during the fourteen-week strike. The
three defendants were accused of "criminal conspiracy" to injure the business of the
Paine Lumber Company....
Darrow himself maintained that the fundamental question posed by the Kidd case
was "whether when a body of men desiring to benefit their conditions, and the condition of their fellow-men, shall strike .. .these men can be put to jail." 420

A Philadelphia paper reported a 1903 labor incident:
DARROW'S CLOSING ADDRESS INCLUDED A VEHEMENT APPEAL FOR
UNION CAUSE AND A BITTER CONDEMNATION OF THE OPERATORS
FOR CRUELTY AND BLINDNESS. 420 An estimated 10,000 anthracite coal miners
walked off the job in 1900 under the leadership of John Mitchell, president of the
United Mine Workers of America. Within a week, 100,000 miners were on strike.
The average annual wage of the miner was then about $250, according to Mitchell.
Among the union's wage demands was a 20 per cent increase for day laborers who
were receiving less than $1.50 [per diem] ....427
423.

Samoff, supra note 391, at 611.

424.

Milwaukee Sentinel, Nov. 1, 1898, at 1.

425. A. Weinberg, Attorney For the Damned 267-68 (19S7).
426. Philadelphia North American, Feb. 15, 1903, at 1.
427. A. Weinberg, supra note 425, at 327.
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As a result, an agreement was negotiated but two years later when the
union asked for an eight-hour day, a twenty percent increase and
recognition of the union, the company balked and a massive coal strike
began in May 1902. Later that same year, after a long impasse, President Roosevelt initiated a series of conferences which led to the appointment of a seven-man federal mediation panel. In March of 1903 the
Arbitration Commission reached its conclusions. A ten percent raise and
an eight-hour day were put into effect. While the union was not formally
recognized, anti-union discrimination was outlawed and future disputes
between the miners and the operators were to be handled by a Board
of Conciliation. "'It was generally conceded that labor gained greatly by
this arbitration ....I ,ll
The point of this digression into the history of the labor movement
is not to point out that arbitration had been thought a useful and proven
tool long before Taft-Hartley; but rather it is to show the social
atmosphere out of which the Wagner Act evolved. Many of the men
responsible for that legislative enactment in 1935 had lived through
the turmoil of the early days of the labor movement. In the very recent
past men had been prosecuted as criminals for attempting to organize
labor movements. Therefore, when the Wagner Act was passed it was
with a feeling of paternalism toward unions and with a conviction that
the right of these men to be represented must be protected. Consequently,
one wonders if the deletion of language from proposed amendment 10(b)
of the Act which would have provided that the "'[b ] oard may, in its
discretion, defer its exercise of jurisdiction over any such unfair labor
practice in any case where there is another means of prevention provided for by agreement,' ,,429 was really anti-deferral or pro-union. The
labor movement was still in its infancy, so that in a showdown at the
bargaining table, management unquestionably had the most clout. Had
the door been left open to encourage the thrusting of arbitration agreements on the still financially shaky unions, it is probable that many of
them would have gone under. Since Congress was disposed to foster and
protect the labor movement, it seems plausible that the deletion of
section 10(b) was as much a preventive measure to safeguard unionism
as it was a mandate to the Board not to defer.
Twelve years later the Taft-Hartley Act amended the Wagner Act.
It had become apparent to the legislators that the unions, after developing bargaining experience, were in a position to sit down at the conference
table with big business as an equal. It was at this juncture that the much
428. Id. at 409 (remark of Clarence Darrow).
429. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB (citation omitted).
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discussed sections of the Act, 203(d) and 301, were enacted. 8 0 As foes
of Collyer have fairly pointed out, these sections were not a part of
Title I; therefore it may be improper to infer that their adoption was a
legislative sanction for Board deferral in unfair labor practice cases.4" 1
While the argument is persuasive, it is not compelling since the Board's
rejoinder illustrates that there was much floor discussion indicative of
precisely such a sentiment. 8 2 Furthermore, in 1947 a proviso was added
to section 10(a) empowering the Board to cede its authority to state or
territorial agencies if it so desired. While it does not appear that this
has ever occurred, it does tend to undercut the argument that the Board
is the sole depository of all legislative flats regarding unfair labor practices. There is at least a hint that the Board was free to delegate its
authority.
It should also be noted that in the original Wagner Act, section 7
was formulated specifically to protect the employees in their "concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection.1 48 3 Section 8 went on to set forth that "[i]t shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer.., to interfere.., to dominate...
to encourage or discourage membership . . . [or] to refuse to bargain
This was quite obviously directed at employer
collectively . . . .
interference with the rights of the workers. No mention is made of union
interference with the workers. However, in 1947 the pendulum had
begun to swing in the other direction. To the above quoted language of
section 7 was added the phrase "and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities ....,4 Congress was now concerned
with overzealous proselytizing on the part of the union. As a compliment
to section 8(a) of the Act, a new section, 8(b), was added to proscribe
certain types of union conduct. 4 0 The language of this section is
analogous to section 8(a) of the Act which in 1935 had been directed
at employers. Clearly, the unions had begun to wield a power not apparent
in 1935 because Congress felt impelled to draw in the reins on their
activities. It was in this framework-an entirely different setting from
that which existed earlier-that it was thought suitable to pass legislation designed to foster resort to arbitration as a means for settling
430.
431.
432.
supra.
433.
434.
435.
436.

See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
See text accompanying note 278 supra.
S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947) ; see text accompanying notes 304-05
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
Id. § 158(a).
Id. § 157.
Id. § 158(b).
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economic differences. This union growth was still evident 12 years later
at the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act, also known as the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 437 which further
zeroed in on union activity. Thus, in a period covering almost a quarter
of a century, labor had sprung from its infancy and had developed
into what Congress felt was an overreaching adult. Whereas in 1935
the lawmakers were seeking to protect the employees from the evils of
management, by 1959 it was union activity that was being circumscribed.
On balance, strong legislative arguments can be made for both sides
with perhaps the anti-Collyer advocates holding a slight edge from a
strictly literal reading of the statutory language; on the other hand,
scales tip slightly the other way when the legislation is viewed against
its historical backdrop. However, legislation cannot be viewed in a
vacuum. The passage of time, changes in customs and mores, judicial
interpretation, the political climate, and a host of other factors all play
their part in shaping and reshaping the scope and application of nearly
every congressional enactment. It was not thought at the time of its
passage that the Civil Rights Act of 1866,438 which on its face promises
to all citizens without regard to race "the same right ... as is enjoyed
by white citizens ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property," would be employed as a tool for outlawing
discrimination in housing over one hundred years later.3 9 This use of
the Act mildly shocked Justices Harlan and White,440 and probably
even surprised then Acting Attorney General Ramsey Clark who argued
persuasively to the Court that "[t]he fact that the statute lay partially
44
dormant for many years cannot be held to diminish its force today.1 1
What Congress did or did not say or did or did not mean in 1935 or 1947
does not at all guarantee how an act will be viewed by the judiciary
twenty-five years later.
Since the advent of Taft-Hartley we have had a wholehearted acceptance of Spielberg on all levels. None of the opponents of Collyer
have chosen to take issue with its validity. As previously mentioned,
it has even been endorsed by the Supreme Court, " 2 as a sound approach
to disposing of situations in which multiple litigation would otherwise
437. Id. §§ 401-531.
438. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
439. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
440. Id. at 449-80 (Harlan & White, JJ., dissenting).
441. Id. at 437. The Court blandly accepted this adverbial assertion which, to say the
least, was an understatement.
442. In Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 US. 261 (1964), the Court approved the
deferral doctrine although it did not mention Spielberg by name.
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be inevitable. In attacking Collyer none of its assailants has successfully
come to grips with the cornerstone upon which it is founded, namely,
Spielberg. The time and cost factors, the incompetence of arbitrators,
the procedural laxities and a variety of other objections 448 already have
been subjected successfully to the test of Spielberg.444
In addition to the Board's Spielberg doctrine, there has been an
abundance of enthusiasm shown by the judiciary for arbitration. Beginning with the Steelworkers Trilogy4 4 and culminating with Boys Markets,446 the courts have unhesitatingly chosen to give free play to the
arbitral process. While the petitioner in IBEW makes excellent use of the
Board's own argument in C & C Plywood 47 to indicate a predilection
not to defer, the Supreme Court's thoughts on the matter, as echoed in
the words of Justice Potter Stewart, that non-deferral there was approved
mainly because there was no arbitration clause, have a far greater impact
8
than the words of the brief writer for the Board. 44 It is also significant
that in the intervening years since Taft-Hartley, as Spielberg grew in
stature and the courts showed an ever increasing preference for encouraging arbitration, there was no congressional action to alter this trend.
The remarks of Judge Wyzanski in CWA are interesting in this context.
As petitioner sought to persuade the court that Collyer represented an
abdication of statutory authority and a serious departure from the intent
of the Labor Management Relations Act, Judge Wyzanski probed
counsel for some authority to support the proposition that the Board could
not in its discretion defer. While petitioner scanned his notes for authorities, the judge offered the comment 449 that he would be highly surprised
if any such case existed, since such a position represented the antithesis
of his understanding of this particular piece of legislation which he had
helped to draft. The court further proffered that, to its knowledge, there
had never been a successful mandamus action against the Board under
section 10(f) when it had chosen in its discretion to defer.
There is case law supporting deferral,4 50 however, and counsel's lone
citation of UAW v. NLRB 45 1 was explained by the three judges as a case
in which the Board had already asserted jurisdiction but had failed to
443. See Section VI B supra.
444. This point has been addressed by the Board in at least one of its briefs. Brief for
Respondent beginning at 31, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB.
445. Note 33 supra.
446.

398 U.S. 235 (1970).

447.
448.
449.
450.
451.

See, e.g., text accompanying note 290 supra.
See also Brief for Respondent at 20, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB.
Remarks of Judge Wyzanski in open court (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 1973).
See NLRB v. Carroll-Naslund Disposal, Inc., 399 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1966) (per curiam).
455 F.2d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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make sufficient findings of fact to support its decision. Thus, it does not
stand for the proposition that the court had ordered the Board to assert
jurisdiction initially.
The best policy argument for those who would prefer to see the speedy
demise of Collyer might seem to lie in an attack on its untrammeled proliferation.4! 5 2 While the decision itself supposedly was applicable only to
section 8(a) (5) situations, it has been rapidly extended into other
areas,453 perhaps somewhat haphazardly. There would be sound basis for
much of this expansion were it not for Spielberg. But Spielberg itself was
in the 8 (a) (3) area and a review of its application would indicate that in
reality Collyer adds little if anything to Spielberg, except to apply the
principle prospectively instead of after the fact.
A far more persuasive rationale for setting aside Collyer would be not
in the area of policy argument but in a full analysis of the legal implications of its waiver and exhaustion of remedies theories. In Collyer we are
assured that:
[w]e are not compelling any party to agree to arbitrate disputes arising during
a contract term, but are merely giving full effect to their own voluntary agreements
4r4
to submit all such disputes to arbitration ....

This viewpoint is reflected in the briefs of the Board."" In its own decision in Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 410 the Board emphati-

cally stated that:
although the Board has ... held repeatedly that statutory rights may be "waived"
by collective bargaining, it has also said that such a waiver "will not readily be
inferred" 457
and there must be "a dear and unmistakable showing" that the waiver
occurred.

The IBEW brief cited case law for this identical proposition. 4 In
Collyer, and the line of cases which follow, not only are the parties not
waiving their right to go to the Board, but in fact are crying to be heard.
The Board attempts to extricate itself from this quandary by urging that
in light of its retention of jurisdiction this is not a waiver but merely a
postponement of remedy. The Board's answer to this question is uncertain if, as suggested by the Board's General Counsel, the Board resorts to
452. See Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB.
453. See Section IV supra.
454. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
455. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent beginning at 24, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB.
456. 121 NJ.LRB. 953 (1958).
457. Id. at 956, citing International News Serv. Div., 113 N.L.R.B. 1067 (1955) and cases
cited therein.
458. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 124, 132 (1967), enforced, 410 F.2d 953 (6th
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Aircraft,409 a case heavily reoutright dismissal as it did in Consolidated
406
majority.
Collyer
the
by
lied upon
An equally difficult issue (which the Board has attempted to avoid by
postulating its exhaustion of remedies theory) is by what authority it can
force unwilling parties to the arbitral forum. It has long been a principle
of arbitration that "[i]f the agreement does contain clear time limits for
filing and prosecuting grievances, failure to observe them generally will
result in a dismissal of the grievance if the failure is protested." 401 It is
nothing more than an exercise of circuitous reasoning to suggest that the
parties can exhaust remedies from which they have already been precluded by the time limits of their own contract. If the Board presumes to
waive these time limits by what authority does it do so? Is this not a
rewriting of the contract in direct violation of H.K. Porter Co. v.
NLRB?462 Petitioners have forcefully urged this argument. 403 The Board
in its exhaustion of remedies theory offers a less than satisfactory answer
and in fact never really confronts the issue. As Member Jenkins noted in
his dissent in Collyer:
[I]f the [individual] becomes exhausted, instead of the remedies, the issues of public

policy are never reached and an airing of the grievance never had .... 404

Of the framers of Collyer, Board Member Brown appears to have
shown the most prescience as to what the true scope of the doctrine
should or would be." 5 While the Board has been finding more disputes
arguably arbitrable and thus deferrable than Member Brown might have
expected, it was his feeling that the ambit of Collyer should include 8(a)
(1) and 8(a) (3) as well as 8(a) (5) violations. 4 0 As has been indicated,
the cases which followed Collyer have long since exceeded even his objectives.4 7 This should not have been an entirely unexpected result and was
alluded to in the commentary which followed Collyer.4' s To begin with,
it has been held since the earliest days of the Board that: "[A] violation
by an employer of any of the four subdivisions of Section 8, other than
Cir. 1969) (cited in Brief for Petitioner at 51-52, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB).
459. 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943).
460. Nash Address, supra note 65, at 157.
461. F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 105 (rev. ed. 1960) (footnote
omitted). See also cases cited at id. n.93.
462. 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
463. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 31-32, Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB.
464. 192 N.L.R.B. at 852 (quoting NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S.
418, 425 (1968)).
465. 192 N.L.R.B. at 844-45 (concurring opinion).
466. Id. at 845; see note 122 supra and accompanying text.
467. See Section IV supra.
468. Nash Address, supra note 65, at 154.
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subdivision one, is also a violation of subdivision one."4 09 In fact, NLRB
form 501 (2-67)-used for the filing of unfair labor practices against employers-section (h) states: "The above-named employer has engaged in
... unfair labor practices within the meaning of section 8 (a), subsections
(1) and
" Therefore, although not so expressed by the
majority, it was evident at the outset that section 8(a) (5) was merely
the tip of the iceberg. Furthermore, the strong reliance 70 on Spielberg, of
which Collyer is a logical extension, should have been indicative of the
broader application that Collyer would ultimately receive. Indeed, the
General Counsel for the Board discerned such implications. 7 '
Aside from the thorny problem of compelling the parties to do something for which the contract did not provide when time limits had run,
thereby, at least indirectly, rewriting the contract,4 7 - there are other deficiencies in the reasoning of the majority. For example, Consolidated Aircraft Corp.,4 73 one of the two cases relied on heavily by the majority, had
been buried in the Board archives until unearthed in Collyer. The other
case, Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 74 was really not a strong deferral case
because there was no unfair labor practice involved. 47" Also, as has been
noted in the foregoing discussion, deferral cases between 1960 and 1970
were fewer and fewer so as to have become virtually non-existent when
Collyer was decided.4 7 Moreover, Carey v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 77 hailed as championing deferral, also contains language that "notwithstanding the availability of arbitration, the 'superior authority of the

Board may be invoked at any time'

....

)7478

It is most interesting that

after the Supreme Court had finished its pronouncements in Carey, the
Board went ahead and decided the case anyway, reversing the arbitrator.479
However, as we have seen in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,4s ° if the
Supreme Court is bent on arriving at a certain decision, a mere interval
of twenty-five years will not stand in the way; nor will one hundred years,
469. The Developing Labor Law, supra note 390, at 66 (footnote omitted). See also note
62 supra.
470. 192 N.L.R.B. at 841.
471. Nash Address, supra note 65, at 154.
472. 192 N.L.R.B. at 846-47, 849 (Member Fanning, dissenting). See also text at note
256 supra.
473. 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943), modified and enforced, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944).
474. 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969).
475. 192 N.L.R.B. at 849 (Member Fanning, dissenting).
476. See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
477. 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
478. 192 NL.R.B. at 848 (citing Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. at 272).
479. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 768, 775 (1967).
480. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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for that matter. Furthermore, while Schlitz is not a strong case, the Board
did defer, and, although the history of deferral is inconsistent, such a history undeniably exists. One may say that the Board's later action in Carey
highlights the need for accessibility to the Board. Proponents of Collyer
can argue to the contrary that this demonstrates that deferral does not
deprive the petitioning party of all recourse to the Board, but rather that
the Board stands ready to rectify a result clearly repugnant to the Act.
The policy arguments vocally espoused by Member Jenkins that
[i]ndeed, responsible officials of the Steelworkers Union, whose espousal and support
of arbitration led to the Trilogy, have publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with
the high costs, delays, and massive "bogging-down" volume of arbitration, all of
48
which led to its use as a weapon against the union '

lose much of their impact in light of the recent collective bargaining
agreement negotiated by the United Steelworkers which commits them to
binding arbitration for the next four years.48 ' The specter of Collyer quite
obviously did not deter the negotiation of this arrangement. Also the invocation of Lockridge by Member Jenkins as ringing the death knell for
Collyer has done little to impede its growth. Apparently, he was the only
member to perceive such implications. In the only appellate brief to rely
on Lockridge,4s8 the CWA acknowledged that it was perhaps nothing
more than a reiteration of Garmon,484 and the Supreme Court itself
pointed out that Lockridge485 was not a section 301 suit.
Our cases also clearly establish that individual union members may sue their
employers under § 301 for breach of a promise embedded in the collective-bargaining
agreement that was intended to confer a benefit upon the individual. Plainly, however,
this is not such a lawsuit. 486

One peripheral area of some concern, not touched upon particularly in
Collyer, is the problem of fixed or rigged arbitrations.4 8 7 There is no doubt
that this occurs, but its prevalence is difficult to ascertain. Naturally those
who decry Collyer can point to instances where the arbitral process has
been grossly abused. A glaring example of such abuse is Star Expansion
481. 192 N.L.R.B. at 855 (Member Jenkins, dissenting) (footnote omitted).
482. U.S. News & World Report, May 14, 1973, at 97.
483. Brief for Petitioner at 18-19, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB. See also text accompanying
notes 254-55 supra.
484. Brief for Petitioner at 19, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB.
485. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
486. Id. at 298-99 (citation omitted).
487. P. Hays, Labor Arbitration 62-66 (1966); Meltzer, Book Review, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev.
211 (1966); Seitz, Book Review, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 698 (1967); Stockman, Book Review, 19
Stan. L. Rev. 707 (1967); Vladeck, Book Review, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1021 (1966).
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Industries Corp.488 In that case an employee had led a successful campaign for the decertification of the IBEW. At his discharge hearing, which
was governed by the old contract, he was represented before a hostile
employer by an IBEW attorney who previously had attacked his decertification activities. The arbitrator, also selected by IBEW, arrived at the
expected result---discharge for just cause. However, hard cases make bad
law and it would be as rash to discard the entire deferral system because
of isolated abuses as it would be to outlaw automobiles because of a small
number of reckless drivers. The Board has shown no hesitancy in refusing
to defer under Collyer in section 8(a) (3) and other areas where it felt
intervention was required or abuse was possible.4P9 There is, then, no
evidence that the Board is acting any less diligently in its Collyer review
than it has in its Spielberg review, which received the approval of the
appeals court in Local 425, Office and Professional Employees International v. NLRB. 9O Also, with the decision of the Supreme Court in
Vaca v. Sipes,491- an employee faced with a union that is dragging its heels
can seek immediate court review on the grounds that the union has been
derelict in its duty of fair representation, rather than being forced to exhaust his administrative remedies as would otherwise be the case.
One issue hardly touched upon in any of the litigation which has flowed
from Collyer is the question of whether or not deferral under Collyer
constitutes a final order of the Board which is then appealable. Except for
the bald assertion by petitioner in the CWA492 case that this does constitute a final order and a lone footnote by intervenor in Enterprise Publishing C0 93 intimating the contrary, the jurisdictional question has not
been raised. The general rule is that
[t]he only final orders within the meaning of Sections 10(e) or (f) are those entered
488. 164 N.L.R.B. 563 (1967), enforced sub nom. United Elec. Workers v. N LRB, 409
F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
489. See, e.g., Machinist's Lodge 68, 205 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (Aug. 3, 1973) (8(b) (2)) ; Jack
Watkins, G.M.C., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 98 (May 16, 1973) (8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2)); Local 1197,
CWA, 202 N.L.thB. No. 45 (Mar. 6, 1973) (8(b)(1)(A)); Asko, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. No.
30 (Mar. 12, 1973) (8(a)(3)); Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 125 (Feb.
13, 1973) (8(a)(1)); Jacobs Transfer, Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (Jan. 11, 1973) (8(a)(3)).
490. 419 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
491. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
492. Brief for Petitioner at 8 n.13, Local 6222, CWA v. NLRB, in which without supportive citation petitioner stated "[t]here is one certainty, however-the dismisal of the
Complaint in its entirety is a final Order."
493. Brief for Brockton Newspaper Guild as Intervenor at 6-7 n.1, Enterprise Publishing
Co. v."LRB.
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by the Board in unfair labor practice cases, either dismissing a complaint in whole
4
or in part or finding an unfair labor practice and directing a remedyA.

It is open to question whether, when the Board retains jurisdiction, it has
issued a final order. The term "final order" connotes the idea that the
Board has taken its last look at a case. If that were true, it would severely
undercut the Board's position that they have not forced a party to waive
his rights but merely deferred the application of a remedy if needed. On
the other hand, if the Board is correct, then such deferrals are at least
arguably non-final and therefore not appealable. Oddly enough, the Board
has not even confronted the petitioners on this point. Perhaps it is simply
a matter of strategy. By not raising any objection on jurisdictional
grounds, the Board has expedited appeal of these cases. Thus, the Collyer
question should reach the Supreme Court speedily. Should the Court then
uphold Collyer, it will be interesting to see if the Board invokes a jurisdictional defense to preclude the appeal of variations which may arise as
offshoots of Collyer. This would throw the parties back into the arbitral
arena where many potentially appealable issues might be resolved, thus
further lightening the burden of the Board. Obviously, petitioners have
not raised the jurisdictional issue since to do so successfully would preclude the review they are seeking.
There are still other areas for conjecture such as how far the outstretched arms of "baby Collyer" will reach. For example, will it extend
into the representation area? At least one case has shown implications of
the extension of Collyer into accretion questions. 415 Thus far the Board
appears not to have deferred in the 10(k) area.4 90 Strong criticism has
been leveled at any attempt to defer in the aforementioned areas, especially 10(k), since the arbitrator has binding authority over only two of
the three parties.4 ~
Further, in its approach to certain questions, the Board seems to realize
that, in order effectively to encourage the use of arbitration, it must itself
be willing to undertake certain tasks. For example, if an arbitrator declined to arbitrate a case on the grounds that the time limits for arbitration had passed, or a party had refused to arbitrate after deferral under
494. The Developing Labor Law, supra note 390, at 874 (citing Local 542, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826 (1964)).
495. Champlin Pet. Co., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (Jan. 8, 1973).
496. See, e.g., Local 354, IBEW, 200 N.L.R.B. No. 92 (Nov. 29, 1972). See also Local 1,
Bricklayers Union, 195 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (Jan. 27, 1972), enforced, 475 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir.
1973), where the Board not only showed no hesitancy in accepting jurisdiction but dismissed
out of hand petitioner's demand that the Board await the recommendations of the trial examiner.
497. Comment, supra note 43, beginning at 1195.
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Collyer by raising time limits as a defense, the Board will, and should,
hear the grievance.4 98 The May 1973 guidelines also tend to indicate that
the Board will continue to exercise its authority to afford the opposing
parties a wide latitude of discovery before arbitration; 40 such a policy
was specifically approved by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,00° to facilitate production of relevant information prior to
arbitration. Certainly, it is logical that if the Board is going to encourage
the use of arbitration in resolving economic difficulties, it should encourage
the furnishing of relevant information so that the parties can be prepared
to confront the issues knowledgeably.
Perhaps unions will attempt to circumvent Collyer by negotiating a
clause in their contracts specifically preserving arbitration rights but precluding the use of arbitration during the pendency of an unfair labor
practice charge. If the United Steelworkers contract is to be a guideline,
such clauses are unlikely. However, there is another potential avenue for
skirting Collyer. According to the May 1973 guidelines, deferral will occur if an individual does not explicitly indicate his refusal to be bound.
As the General Counsel himself notes, this criterion, which conforms to the Spielberg

"acquiescence standard," arguably "would provide parties to bargaining agreements

a convenient means of avoiding deferral," since the party to a contract wishing to

avoid arbitration in a dispute involving unlawful coercion or discrimination against
individual employees would, instead of filing the charge itself, "arrange for an individ-

ual discriminatee to file the charge and communicate to the regional office his opposition to the resolution of his claim under the contract arbitration procedures."501

This guideline was undoubtedly devised to guard against an employee's
being ensnared in a fixed arbitration proceeding. The Board may now find
itself confronted with fixed non-arbitration arrangements. One suspects
the Board will take a long, hard look at such cases to assure itself that the
union-company collusion against the employee is real, not simply manufactured as a device by which to avoid Collyer.
If Collyer is disavowed by the courts, all of this theorizing becomes
498. See discussion in Colyer Deferral Policy, 82 Lab. Rel. Rep. (News & Background)
315 (Apr. 16, 1973); text accompanying note 52 supra.
499. NLRB General Counsel's Revised Guidelines for Processing Collyer Arbitration
Deferral Cases, 83 Lab. Rel Rep. (Analysis) 6-7 (May 14, 1973) [hereinafter cited as General Counsel's Guidelines]; Revised Guidelines Issued by the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board for Use of Board Regional Offices in Cases Involving Deferral to
Arbitration, 83 Lab. Rel. Rep. (News & Background) 41, 47-49 (May 14, 1973); see, e.g.,
American Standard, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (June 4, 1973).
500. 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
501. General Counsel's Guidelines 8.
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moot. Whether in resolving this problem the courts will view Collyer as
a flexible approach or a doctrinaire device remains to be seen. But, at the
core of the controversy, two principles of the law must clash head on and
the courts must determine which shall yield.
The most significant consideration thus far advanced for disavowing
Collyer is the recurring principle that men are free to arrange their affairs
as best suits them and that neither the courts nor the Board have been
established to rearrange such affairs. This concept and its recent espousal
in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB 5°2 must be confronted by the courts in considering the questions posed. In waiving the time limits of innumerable
contracts, as the Board in a policy decision has chosen to do, is the Board
not in fact rewriting the contract for the parties? It is patently absurd
to suggest that, in forcing the parties to arbitrate after the time limits have
run, the terms of the agreement have not been altered. Even if the NLRB
keeps its promise to afford a later remedy, any delay in that remedy
would mitigate its effectiveness.
In counterpoise to H.K. Porter is an equally venerable principle of
law, that logic must sometimes give way to pragmatic exigencies. When
reason and result are at odds, what shall be the denouement? Perhaps the
answer was best articulated by Justice Holmes when he opined that "[t]he
''
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. COS
Spielberg,
of which Collyer is a logical extension, epitomizes this approach. It has
proven itself a useful tool for the Board to lighten its ever-burgeoning
caseload, which, although played down, is conceded by the Board to be a
strong motivating factor.5" It has been employed for many years without
any evidence of undue abuse.
In balancing these two competing considerations, one is ineluctably
drawn to the conclusion that, in this instance, pragmatic considerations
will prevail over philosophical ones and, in the end, the technically sound
legal rationale that this is a rewriting of contracts, will give way to the
more mundane and simplistic appraisal that Collyer works.
Furthermore, the courts are not unsympathetic to the caseload of the
Board and have in fact been using a Collyer-like approach themselves
for years. Ever since Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills50 the courts have
502.
503.

397 U.S. 99 (1970).
O.W. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1909).

504. General Counsel's Memorandum, Arbitration Deferral Policy Under Collyer-Ravised Guidelines, May 10, 1973, at 17 n.17 (citing National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1
(Aug. 4, 1972), wherein the Board said "considerations arising from the increasing case
load before this five-man Board . . .should not be gainsaid .... "). See also text accompanying note 211 supra.

505. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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been sending the parties back to the arbitral forum to settle their differences. While apparently no case specifically has directed the parties to
arbitrate after time limits have run, it is not impossible to conceive that
the courts might label such an alteration of a contract as merely procedural rather than substantive,5 08 thus allowing Collyer to proceed intact.
Spielberg itself, which Collyer follows, has been specifically endorsed by
the courts. 501
What more propitious moment to submit this particular issue to the
Supreme Court than at a time when the Court is itself manifesting a decided discontent with its own caseload? There is talk of creating a new
appellate court devoted to determining which cases will eventually be considered by the Supreme Court.108 Also, it should be noted that Collyer
and Boys Markets have been decided at the height of a Republican administration. It may be more than coincidence that Spielberg was a
product of the Eisenhower era. If ever the time were ripe politically,
pragmatically and judicially for an affirmation of Collyer, that time is
now. It is, therefore, submitted that Collyer is here to stay.
Although this new approach seems destined to remain with us, what is
far more speculative is the shape and form into which it will evolve. With
each daily change in the complexion of Collyer bringing new panegyrics
immediately countered by a wave of polemics, the words of the General
Counsel shortly after the enunciation of Collyer offer as probative a prognostication of its future as any available:
I have no dear answers to many of the issues raised [concerning Colyer] ... I feel
myself in much the same position as the farmer who took his young son to the city
for the first time. The boy asked his father, "Pa, what are all those little clocks for on
the posts at the edge of the sidewalk?" The father replied that he didn't rightly know.
When the boy asked what the lights on the tall poles on the street comers flashing
red and yellow and green were for, Pa didn't know that either. Standing in front
of an elevator in an office building, the boy asked, "Pa, why do those people get into
506. E.g., International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), where the Board, in
binding employees to an arbitration proceeding of which they had no notice and in which
they did not take part, cited approvingly language from Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.
1949), noting that "[ajfter all is said and done, procedural regularity [is] not . . . an end
in itself, but [is) ... a means of defending substantive interests."' 138 NXL.R.B. at 928.
The court in upholding the Board's decision had no trouble with the Board's characterization
of what it had accomplished as being merely procedural. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784
(7th Cir.). It would seem but a short step to achieve the same rationalization with Collyer.
507. See, e.g., Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1972) (Title VII
case).
508. See Comment, The National Court of Appeals: Composition, Constitutionality, and
Desirability, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 863 (1973).
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that little room and the door shuts by itself and when it opens the people are gone?"
The father couldn't rightly say-maybe it was a magic room for making people disappear. Finally the boy asked, "Pa, do you mind me asking you all these questions?"
Unhesitatingly Pa assured him, "Why of course not, son. If you don't ask questions,
how you ever gonna learn."
It is with perhaps the same assurance that I have dealt with the questions raised by
the Collyer case. And it is with the same confidence that I will try to field any of your
questions or comments.5 09
509. Nash Address, supra note 65, at 158.

